

The Journal of Liberal Religion

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Vol. 1

WINTER, 1940

No. 3

\$1 a year—25c a copy



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Manuscripts and correspondence should be directed to the Editor at 5701 Woodlawn Avenue, Chicago, Ill. Subscriptions should be sent to the Rev. Edward W. Ohrenstein, Hinsdale, Ill.

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We take pleasure in announcing that with this issue the JOURNAL passes from a partnership to a trinity. The Universalist Ministerial Association now joins with the Unitarian Ministerial Union and The Meadville Theological School as a sponsor of our new quarterly. Henceforth, the associate editors will severally represent the two cooperating ministerial organizations.

Meditation on the Élite

ALBERT GUÉRARD, SR.

Dim words may be brought into sharp relief by a sudden ray of light. Such was my experience recently with the word "élite." I had been vaguely acquainted with it for fully half a century. I had found it commonpace enough, a trifle pretentious, perhaps, but harmless. Then a few months ago, I read in the French magazine *L'Illustration* an account of Franco's victorious entry into Madrid. "It was the triumph of the élite!", wrote the enthusiastic French journalist. This evoked at once in my mind Ortega y Gasset's thought-provoking book, *The Revolt of the Masses*. I realized in a flash what the negligible French scribe, and the delicate Spanish critic meant by drawing such a line: the élite, the masses. On the one hand, the 'good' people, the 'nice' people, the clever people; on the other, the rabble. And I remembered also those words of Labruyère, which sound so strangely in the cultured, courtly, conservative century of Louis XIV: "The people have no wit, the great have no soul. If it comes to a choice, I do not hesitate: I want to be with the people:" *Je veux être peuple*.

A hard choice. I am not a primitivist: I have no romantic faith in the holiness of the great unwashed, and in the virtues of the noble savage. I do not believe with Rousseau that refinement corrupts morality. It is my business to study (and to teach, alas!) "civilization" and "culture," I know that these are complex, fragile, hard-won, precarious achievements, that they are consciously enjoyed by the few, transmitted by the few, created by the few. It is nonsense to assert that masterpieces like *The Iliad* 'jest growed' out of the people's soul: it is they that shape the people's soul. *Vox Populi* in its might is but a vague hubbub.

What I firmly hold to be true of art seems to me no less true of science and invention. The entity Demos has never formulated a law or devised a machine. Perhaps a Copernicus, a Newton, an Einstein are not the solitary peaks that we imagine; it is probable that they would have remained powerless, had not their work been prepared by many half-forgotten pioneers. But all those

obscure forerunners and modest collaborators together form only a very small band indeed. In religion, who could maintain that every man, unaided, is able to evolve his own faith, that the individual could re-create for himself the Bible and the Christian tradition? The common man—you, reader, and myself—responds, but does not originate. Even his response never is wholly spontaneous: it is to a large extent the result of imitation, conformity. There are very few great poets, but an innumerable company of able versifiers and teachers of poetry. There are very few discoverers, voyaging through strange seas of thought alone, but regiments, divisions and armies of well-trained, competent scientists. There are very few prophets and mystics, but a vast flock of well-meaning, docile Christians. It is not inconceivable that even the most personal, the most intense of our experiences, love, be also a standardized product. Perhaps great lovers are as rare as great poets: we borrow their words, our imitative lives reflect some of their light and absorb some of their glow. Whether we sing, experiment, pray or love, we follow. Mankind lives and grows through the genius of the few.

Here we must proceed with cautious steps. "Genius" is one of the most ambiguous and misleading of words. I am averse to the doctrine of 'Heroes' or 'Providential Men,' proclaimed by Carlyle and Napoleon III. The 'genius' too often is the common man acclaimed by common men, because he represents mediocrity or prejudice on a gigantic scale: Napoleon, Hitler. Mankind lives, not through a dozen sensational leaders, Supermen like Moses or Mohammed, but through a few thousands of original thinkers and earnest workers. Our hope lies in the open conspiracy of small, conscious, organized minorities.


What I mean by 'organized' is not that this minority should form a Committee with rules of procedure. I mean that it should form a group, aware of common purpose and common effort, in space or time. The Apostles were such a minority: infinitesimal and indispensable. The poets of the same civilization are linked by their traditions: there is an apostolic succession of the spirit. The scientists have to go through a long initiation, which separates them from the laymen. Every decisive step is taken by an

individual: but it would be lost to the world, if there were not a small band able to understand, verify, improve, disseminate. Poetry, science, religion are oligarchic; and so, in the last analysis, is government. There is no pure tyranny, and there is no pure democracy. The initiated, active, conscious group is the essential, the dynamic element.

What is the difference then between 'the chosen few' whose praises I have been singing, and 'the élite' so aptly personified in General Franco? Simply that the 'chosen few' are thinking only of the work, the cause, the truth; the élite advances claims, seeks privileges beyond its actual services, is eager to cash in on its alleged superiority. It is using that superiority as a point of vantage to hold up the community: an exact definition of profiteering.

The notion of 'the élite' involves a double fallacy. The first is that superiority in one field confers general superiority. The second is that all the members of the group partake of that general superiority. Now both these assertions are in obvious contradiction with the facts. Louis XIV, because he was the Lord's Anointed, was convinced that he should win every game of billiards, and his courtiers saw to it that he did. Napoleon told a scientist—Chaptal, if I remember correctly—who had dared to argue a point with him: "You caused me to scratch my head: let not that happen again!" We smile: a despot can jail us, but that does not prove him infallible. A man may possess a splendid poetic imagination, and be little better than a fool in questions of science, business or conduct. A scientist may be a very poor philosopher. Newton devoted much time to vagaries which would cause a sophomore to shrug. Einstein himself, and a whole bevy of astronomical physicists, are not above mediocrity when they touch upon politics or religion. I wonder whether a single Nobel Prize winner, even in his prime, would have stood a good chance in the ring against Joe Louis.

Not only is 'general superiority' a delusion when it is supposed to cover unrelated fields; but, even in a limited domain, any man is 'superior' only in spots. Psychologists, with a naive desire for simplification, assign to the mystery called 'intelligence' a single



quotient: a man who scores 140 is more 'intelligent' than the one who is granted a paltry 120. But history reveals that great men, who were inspired on certain occasions, were almost moronic at other times. I have kept my faith in Woodrow Wilson; he was not only a great idealist, but he was also shrewd and practical (you can not imagine the Youth in Longfellow's *Excelsior!* ever reaching the White House); but no less certainly, he was obstinate and weak by turns, bigoted in his party and racial creed, almost wilfully uninformed, and not invariably ingenuous. Joffre, engineer, organizer, strategist—in the lobbies as well as in the field—was not merely the embodiment of massive commonsense: he was surprisingly clever. Yet, in his 'nibbling' policy, he showed himself tragically, monumentally stupid. Great men? Undoubtedly: on such a date, at such a place, not yesterday, not tomorrow. But admission to 'the élite' is supposed to be an ordination: *Tu es sacerdos in aeternum*.

The second fallacy is that superiority is conferred automatically by membership in the group. It is not the individual as such who excels: it is the caste, the class, the club, the clique. This is not a safe criterion. Position, wealth, and even culture, may be privileges which are transmitted rather than deserved. Very mediocre men have sat in the House of Lords, or on the board of their fathers' companies. Dullards have education crammed into them by experts, regardless of expense, while gifted children fight every inch of the way. But the unworthy members of an alleged élite are not exclusively heirs. They may also be self-seekers shrewd enough to get into the group through push and pull, rather than through genuine merit; they may be parasites who attach themselves to the fortune of a vigorous leader, and are carried with him to the heights.

An aristocracy, an élite, is an association for mutual defense. Its first care is to draw round itself a line as sharp as possible. Then it asserts the fundamental equality of all those within the circle, the fundamental inferiority of all those without. So it was with the old nobility: there were ranks and degrees among them, but they could associate freely and intermarry without losing caste. The rest of mankind were not *well-born*, or, more insolently, in French, they were not *born* at all: "*des gens qui ne sont pas nés.*"

In the Prussian Army, away from the parade ground, General and Lieutenant were social equals. But between Lieutenant and commoner, there was an abyss. The line may be drawn so that the élite will include a whole nation: democracy within, all Germans as brothers, all equally precious in their Führer's eyes, if only they be of true Teutonic blood; every German immeasurably superior to the rabble without, the lesser tribes without the law, the Czechs, the Poles, the Jews.

Such a paradox can be maintained only through artifice—force or fraud. Instead of letting natural excellence have its way, privilege is invoked. The colored man must not be allowed to compete freely with the white man, in South Africa or in Kenya: for, in free competition, he might prove himself to be superior; which would be absurd, and even immoral, since we know him to be inferior.

Thus the test of real ability must be abandoned: it might destroy at any moment the providential line between the élite and the rabble. We must substitute external criteria and shibboleths: a handle to one's name, blue rather than brown eyes, a nose that is neither too broad nor too aquiline, expertness in the social graces of the group—conversation, the dance, sport and dress. At one time—not infinitely remote—no man who could not ride to hounds, quote Horace and stand his bottle of port was a gentleman; and only to gentlemen could be entrusted the government of England.

But an élite conscious of its existence as an élite, claiming its rights, immunities and privileges as an élite, thereby destroys its claims. For true superiority is willing to work, to serve, not for prestige, but for the sake of righteousness; not behind a wall of prejudices, but in the open, without favor. For to seek protection is a confession of weakness; and to exalt one's self by humiliating the lower orders, the 'booboisie,' the rabble, is to reveal oneself insensitive and coarse. There is no greater breach of taste than boasting of one's taste; there is no such damning evidence of vulgarity as ranking one's self among the élite.

I repeat that I am not advocating 'equality,' or 'democracy,' if the two terms must needs go together. We hold this truth to be self-evident, that all men were not created equal. One can run

faster, hit harder, sing better than his neighbors: why not also think more subtle thoughts, or feel more nobly? We also know that between the innumerable manifestations of superiority, there is no common measure. Who shall appraise on a single scale the hero, the poet, the saint, the scientist, the artist, the statesman, the mother, the lover? Is a bank director 'better' or 'greater' than a preacher or a movie star? How does the teacher of literature—whom the world could so easily spare—compare with the scavenger, whose work is indispensable, if the crowded city is to live? These things are incommensurable. Why not drop all comparisons, and, in every domain, let the best man lead? Provided his ability be submitted to a fair test, not accepted on the strength of an irrelevant shibboleth; provided his leadership be limited to the field in which he has proved himself a master.

The most grievous of our ills, social as well as international, are caused by those inveterate notions of supremacy and privilege—pride and selfishness—which we seek to justify with the formula: "the defense of the élite." We dread social justice, because it might compel a new valuation of all values. Those nations which are the 'élite' of the world—the biggest, the wealthiest, the most muscular—frown upon international equity: it would make the 'rabble' of despicable little fellows, Esthonia, Latvia, Czechoslovakia, as safe, as 'good' as themselves. What would be the advantage of being a Great Power? The notion of an élite is evil, because it contradicts both justice and charity. It must be exorcised from our hearts: "supremacy" is sin. The end of the élite would release, not stifle, superiorities, even among their own members: instead of protecting themselves, they would act. There was no need for Jesus, St. Francis, Shakespeare, Einstein, to belong to an élite: they had only to be, and do their work.

The Three Ideas of God

CHARLES HARTSHORNE

In the hundred years since Darwin was a young man, science has made immense advances. Its most fundamental conceptions have been altered and clarified. During this same period theology also has made advances, though of these the public has been less well informed. It has been found that the conception of God upon which, with all their quarrels over details, theologians used to agree, is not the only possible conception, nor even the best one, for either religious or philosophical purposes. There are, indeed, three and only three chief ways of thinking about God. The *first* is that God is in all respects perfect and complete. This means He cannot change, or grow, or in any way increase in value. Therefore nothing man can do can bring any additional values to God. In that case, what does it mean to talk of serving God? This is only one of the embarrassing questions which can be asked of this type of theology. The *second* view of God is that He is perfect and complete in some respects, but not in all. He may be perfect in goodness, or in love; but not in happiness. Never changing in His righteousness, He might yet grow in joy as His creatures served Him, and themselves grew in joy. Is it so strange to say that One who loves perfectly is yet made happier by the increasing welfare of those He loves? Would it not rather be very strange if God, who loves us, gained no new joy from our achievements and growth? The *third* way of thinking about God is that He is not in any respect entirely perfect. It would follow that there is no way in which He could not change. This would deprive the idea of God of most of its value, for one could place no ultimate reliance upon a deity in every way subject to imperfection and alteration.

It is certain that God must be one of the three: perfect in all ways, perfect in some ways, or perfect in no way. If He is perfect in all ways, then the greatest saint can do no more for God than the worst sinner, for neither could possibly add to, or subtract from, what is always wholly perfect. And such a God could not love in a real sense, for to love is to find joy in the joy of others and sorrow in their sorrows, it is to gain through their gains and

lose through their losses, and the wholly perfect could neither gain nor lose. Hence it could not love in a proper sense. On the other hand, if God is perfect in no way, then He would scarcely deserve our worship, religion would have certainly overpraised Him, and we could not rely upon Him either for aid or for justice. Thus only the second possibility is left, that God is *perfect in love*, but never-completed, *ever growing* (partly through our efforts) in the joy, the richness of His life, and this without end through all the infinite future.

Until recently no one, apparently, ever saw clearly that there are these three ways, and only these three, of conceiving God, and it is also only recently that the objections to the first, the usual, way have been at all widely appreciated. This is as definite an advance in thought as anything we owe to Einstein or Darwin. It is a rather simple change, but so is the idea of evolution fairly simple. There is this difference, that the man in the street, or in the parlor listening to the radio, has a better chance of grasping the evidence upon which the new theological doctrine rests than he has of appreciating Darwin's arguments, to say nothing of Einstein's. You can see for yourself that a purely perfect, complete, self-sufficient deity can have nothing to ask of us, for there is nothing we could give Him. *We* might have things to ask of Him, but even this would be senseless, for why should He think it mattered about us, since whatever happens to us His life contains all possible joy and value, and therefore existence as containing this sum of possible values would lack nothing if we did not even exist.

It is not surprising that men have reacted against this idea of God. Nor is it surprising that at first they went to the opposite extreme, and denied the existence of God (as in any way perfect) altogether. The human mind seems to have to work in this way. It begins by an over-simplification, such as that God is simply and without qualification perfect. If this leads to difficulties, as it does, then the opposite simplification is tried: God—if there is any being worthy of the name—is wholly imperfect, there is no being who could, even with qualifications, be called perfect. Only at long last, does it dawn on men that the problem is not so simple, that the mere denial and the mere assertion of perfection may both be wrong, since the truth may lie in the combined assertion

and denial of a perfect being according as perfection is taken in different senses.

To say God is perfect might be defined to mean that He is better than any individual other than Himself. This would leave open the possibility that, though no individual who is not God can be better than He, still He Himself might improve. Unsurpassable by others, He might yet surpass Himself, might grow in value. To conceive God as capable of improvement in *goodness* shocks the religious sense, which feels that God could not possibly be more just or merciful than He is. In ethical quality and in wisdom and power, religion conceives God as already as perfect as anything could be. But does religion assure us that God is equally incapable of improvement in happiness? How can this be if God loves us, and through love shares in our sorrows, and is grieved by our misfortunes and errors? But even here we may call God perfect, if we mean by this that He is not to be surpassed in happiness by any being other than Himself, say Himself at a later time. To say God can increase in happiness (and if He cannot then there is no service we can render Him) is not to say that any other individual is or could be happier than He, but only to say that He himself could be happier. In other words, if perfect means supreme among individuals, then God is in all respects perfect; but if perfect means incapable of growth or improvement, then only in goodness, wisdom, and power is God perfect.

Thus we see how carefully perfection must be defined. And similar care must be exercised with respect to other conceptions commonly applied to God, such as that He is immutable, unchanging. In goodness He is for religion indeed ever the same, as He is in wisdom and power. But love is more than goodness, wisdom, and power, it is also happiness as partly arising from sympathy with the joys of others. This happiness will of course change with changes in the joys of others. But does not God see in advance all the joys that will ever exist? Is He not all-knowing? It has been shown that this argument, plausible as it is, is fallacious. For to know all that is, is not necessarily to know all future events; for the question is, do future events exist? Is it not the essence of the future that it consists of what may or may not exist, that is,

of what is unsettled, indefinite, undecided. If so, then God, who knows things as they are, will know future events only in their character as indefinite, or more or less problematic, nebulous, incomplete as to details. Thus the very great discovery has been made (dating indeed from the 14th century, but neglected until recently) that even omniscience does not mean the total absence of growth or change. What is now unsettled, both in itself and for God, may become settled, and as it does so He will acquire new content for His happiness as derived from sympathy with the creatures.

The old theology was a first approximation; like Newtonian science it was an oversimplification. All its conceptions are true, provided they are qualified as theologians have only recently learned to qualify them.

Who are the theologians who have brought out these simple but relatively new insights, and many others connected with them? One can hardly localize the development in one man. Honors must be shared between such men as our American, William James, the Frenchman, Bergson, several Germans, such as Pfeiderer (who gave a good account of the second type of theology back in the eighties), the Englishman, James Ward, who also reached such a view toward the end of the last century, the Englishman who is now almost an American, A. N. Whitehead, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at Harvard, Edgar Sheffield Brightman, of Boston University, leader of those philosophers who call themselves Personalists, influential especially among the millions of Methodists in this country, William Pepperel Montague, of Columbia, admittedly one of the most brilliant of American philosophers, William Ernest Hocking, Harvard philosopher and authority on foreign missions, the late Italian philosopher, Varisco, one of the best known of his countrymen in philosophy, an Anglican Dean, W. R. Matthews, an Anglican Bishop, F. R. Tennant, who is also distinguished as a philosopher, a British Unitarian, L. P. Jacks, an American Bishop, Francis McConnell, and finally one of the two or three most gifted of recent German philosophers, the late Max Scheler, partly Jewish, and two living German thinkers, Paul Tillich and Alois Wenzl. These are a few of the significant writers who have contributed to what I have

called the new theology. They do not all express the matter in the same way, perhaps they would not all agree with my way of putting it, but I do not think any of them would quarrel very much with the outline I have given. They agree about as well as mediaeval theologians used to do. The common basic conception which they nearly all share is that God, though perfect and never-changing in His character as good, loving, Holy, yet changes and increases in his value as a life of joy and beauty.

We live in a world in which brute force looms large. That may make it more difficult to believe in a divine, a perfect love; but it also makes it more important to do so. It is a strange fate that has overtaken man during the last two thousand years. Having reached the sublime idea of divine perfection, he failed to see that it is impossible to be perfect in love without being other than absolutely perfect in enjoyment. For to love is to find joy in the joys of others, and sorrow in the sorrows of others, and thus to depend partly upon them for one's joy and sorrow. And the ideal of love is so hard for men to understand that they forgot that the perfection of God is the perfection of *love*, and began to think of God as simply perfect in general; and so, without knowing it, they spoiled the conception of divine love. Naturally the result was that many men drifted away from any idea of God at all, and today millions can find no better ideal than that of arbitrary power. Fortunately for the world the root of the difficulty has been discovered. Great philosophers like Bergson and Whitehead, theologians like Bishop Tennant, James Ward, Macintosh, Calhoun, and many others, have been clarifying the relations between love and perfection in God, and I believe that never again will it be possible for generation after generation of leaders of thought calmly to take it for granted that God must be conceived as motionless in pure perfection and self-sufficiency, incapable of receiving anything from man, or of being served by man in any real sense, incapable of anything that ever has been meant by love.

The idea that God's power must be limited, imperfect, is not very new, but it is only recently that men have seen that it is God's happiness, not His power, that must be less than perfect. For it is possible to explain evil in the world through free action

of agents other than God, but no explanation can make sense out of the idea of a will which has purposes yet lacks nothing which it might seek to attain, a mind which knows a changing world yet itself suffers no change, which knows free beings whose action is undetermined in advance yet knows determinately what those actions will be, a mind subject to no risks although its creatures act on their own responsibility and with limited wisdom, and though it loves these creatures, cares for their welfare, and hence must mentally share in their fortunes, good or bad.

A God both perfect and, in other ways, imperfect, can change, whereas a perfect being could change neither for the better nor for the worse, and change would have no significance for it. The objection to a God in all ways imperfect would be that it could in all ways change, and hence might cease to be recognizable at all, might lose its individual identity altogether. The objection to a God in all ways perfect would be that it could in no way change, and hence while it could not lose its identity, it also would not have any significant identity to lose. For we know individual identity as identity through change, and if change is simply omitted from our idea of God, nothing conceivable is left. A changeless being can have no purposes, for purposes refer to the future and the future is related to the present by change. A changeless being cannot love, for to love is to sympathize with, and through sympathy to share in, the changes occurring in the persons one loves.

Since perfection cannot change, and imperfection cannot be changeless, it follows that a God *both* perfect and imperfect will be unchanging in the ways in which He is perfect, and changing in the ways in which He is not perfect. If, as religion says, God is perfect in goodness, wisdom, and power, then He is unchanging in these respects. Is this not what the Bible means when it says God is without shadow of turning? His goodness of purpose will never alter in the slightest. But where in the Bible are we told that God never becomes *happier*, from time to time? We are not told so. What has religion to lose by the idea that God is made happier (though not more wise or good) by the successes of men; as well as grieved by their failures or wickedness? Surely religion has nothing to lose by this idea. Yet until recently

nearly all the theologians in the world spoke of God as incapable of any kind of change, even change in happiness.

Does it not make God more real to us to think of Him as subject to change, as like us in having purposes for the future, memories of the past, and the power to receive additions to His happiness?

The memory of God is an inspiring idea. We say the past is gone. What does this mean? Where has it gone to? Surely not to any place in space, therefore not anywhere, for "where" means, somewhere in space. Or again, if the past were gone in the sense of now not existing at all, how could anything we say of it be true, for can a true statement be about what does not exist at all, that is, about nothing real? Surely, the landing of the Mayflower at Plymouth exists somehow in the universe, or when we speak of it we are merely talking about a dream. And it must exist now, for our statement is true now, and how can a relation be real when the thing it relates to is unreal? Now memory is the way we experience the past as real in the present, to the extent of the memory. Our memory is so feeble that the events we remember are not fully preserved for us by the fact that we remember them. But the events we best remember are the ones most nearly preserved as still real. I can remember a certain wonderful moment so well that the beauty of it is almost fully embodied in the present by that memory. Now if God changes but has perfect knowledge, then all the past must still be before Him without loss of any detail or quality in the present; that is, He must have perfect memory. From this memory no joy once attained anywhere in the world can ever be lost.

You may ask, Must God not have perfect anticipation of the future also? But I answer that anticipation is a different thing from memory, and what makes it different is that it does not even want to be perfect in the same sense as memory would like to be. Our relation to the past is purely that of a spectator. We can do nothing about the past, it has been what it has been, and no power can alter the fact that it has been so. But the future is what we are engaged in deciding, it is our sphere of choice and action. Therefore it is not the function of anticipation to decide exactly what will happen; that function is for the *will*, the practical side of the mind. If you were to anticipate with certainty what your future decisions will be you would have made these decisions

already! The business of anticipation is to see what the *limits of choice* may be. You may have power to decide between saying, hello, and saying, how de-do; and it may be impossible for me to anticipate which you will say. But I may very well be able to anticipate, as at least probable, that you will address me in English, or that you will address me in French, if you do not know English. The role of anticipation is to narrow down the range of possibility in general, of what is conceivable abstractly, to that group of possibilities whose realization is possible, not simply in general, but at some specified future date, and with a certain degree of probability. Anticipation *grades* possibilities, so that action can take account of the most probable lines of action, and try to bring about the one that is most desirable.

Even God's anticipation would have reference to action as choice between probabilities. He would not see what "is to happen," but the range of possible things among which what happens will be a selection. And He will see that a higher percentage of some kinds of things will happen than others, that is, He will see in terms of probabilities. This seems to be the only view of God's knowledge that does not make human freedom impossible, or that does not destroy the religious idea of God as perfect in goodness and wisdom.

The view is also not an utter novelty. It was defended by Levy ben Gerson, in the fourteenth, and Socinus in the sixteenth centuries. It was, however, not to be expected that a Jew and an anti-trinitarian could in those times secure favorable consideration for their doctrines. Today there is no reason why they should not be considered on their merits.

The Idea of Sacrifice in Liberal Christianity

L. J. VAN HOLK

It is not without some hesitation that I set myself to write on this subject. For has not your Editor asked me to contribute by writing on the future of liberal Christianity? Of course, I might begin pleading my case at once, by saying that the future of liberal Christianity depends on its understanding the concept of sacrifice. But wouldn't that look like over-stating my case? I keenly feel my responsibility, when writing from across the Atlantic to my fellow liberals in America. What is the most pressing and important theme to write about just now? Is not, by far, the more urgent problem in Europe: how are we to preserve our traditions of liberty and tolerance? Or what are we to say about the terrifying prospects of crushing armament budgets, unemployment, the imminence of the complete annihilation of our civilization? Certainly, these are the besetting questions of today. But then, do not all those questions imply the problem of sacrifice and of the meaning of divine love? Moreover, there is, without any doubt, a very general feeling in liberal groups in Europe, that in the realm of spiritual guidance and religious thinking, we have failed to give sufficient depth to our work, and have failed thereby to convince others that liberal Christianity *is* the world's need. Here again I think that our difficulties arise mainly from the lack of an understanding of divine love and sacrifice. Let me therefore put my hesitation aside, and try to win the reader to my view, that liberal religion has to preach, to live, to minister the divine sacrifice if it is to have any future at all.

First, let us consider some objections which recur regularly in the discussion of this subject. Sacrifice, we are told, is a remnant of ritualistic magic; it brings the relation of man to God down to a juridical transaction by vicarious suffering; it presupposes the fundamentally primitive conception of a wrathful Deity who must be placated.

(a) Is sacrifice really nothing but a remnant of ritualistic magic? Many ritual practices, of course, are nothing else. But is it not superficial to dismiss the whole notion of sacrifice for

that reason?¹ Whether we have to do with magic and a mania for ritualistic efficiency, or with a sound and keen sense for the true relationship between man and his God depends on the *intention* of the sacrificer. The idea of bringing part of the gifts of life to God has nothing pagan, superstitious, old-fashioned in it. We simply cannot help doing so. We even do it among ourselves. There need not be anything egoistic about bringing a birthday present, or an unexpected gift, for no other reason than gratitude, overflowing gratitude. Rather our objection should be that often we give presents from a grudging heart, and with no generous intention. But that does not destroy the value of bringing offerings as such.

We bring our gifts to God, and we do not hesitate to do so—despite the fact that we feel we ought to give our hearts, our souls, our selves, and nothing less—because they are too small. We are quite correct in taking this attitude, for it does imply that the real meaning of sincere religion is devotion to God, the consecration of human life. That we should express this devotion publicly and symbolically with some gift is appropriate—provided we profess it to be only a symbol, after the manner, in the marriage ceremony, of placing a ring on the finger of the beloved. (Consecration, devotion, or rising to the height of complete self-surrender are but synonyms for the Christian life, whether styled liberal or orthodox, Protestant or Catholic.) Thus to reject the notion of sacrifice as superstitious, magical, ritualistic, is to identify a Romanist excess with the core of religion. Liberal religion ought not to abandon the field to so gross a misunderstanding. A symbolic act of sacrifice to express the consecration of our lives to God, is genuinely Christian and consistently liberal.

(b) But now, what about the objection, that sacrifice is a bringing down of the religious relation to a juridical transaction by vicarious suffering? No doubt, the famous Anselmian theory of redemption can be understood to mean this. And orthodox Christianity has, to say the least, failed to correct this misunderstanding. The death on the Cross has been interpreted, time and

¹Alfred Loisy, the famous Catholic modernist, in his "Essai sur le sacrifice" (1920), has done so, I fear, and has by an excess of rationalism underrated the meaning of sacrifice.

again, as a "lieu-tenant" or vicarious sacrifice, a buying off of the wrath of God. Time and again Christians have looked upon the sufferings of Christ (or of any other human being) as a kind of supreme satisfaction to appease the Deity.

But this is to misunderstand the significance of the death of Christ (it is partly a consequence of christological speculation in connection with trinitarian dogma). For, is there anything simpler and more spontaneous than taking up a burden, too heavy for those you love? "One for all" is the very heart of generosity, of ardent love, and passionate solidarity. (It can be found in the classroom of any school, in the wars of independence of any country, in the history of any religious movement.) The metaphor of "paying a ransom for many" has, to be sure, received a disastrous interpretation in Christian theology. But the primary fact of Christ, giving himself for his companions and followers—is this not as outstanding an example of "salvation by character" as a Unitarian could wish for? As the sense of solidarity among the members of a group deepens, reciprocal help, love, and compassionate vicarious suffering will also deepen. Among the chief opponents to the notion of sacrifice, we find, I fear, a very sharp, clear-cut, but unwholesome individualism that sometimes coincides with liberalism, but which, happily, is no *necessary* part of it!

As long as we understand the death of Christ as an act of supreme love of the Son of Man for man, and as long as we feel that we are His followers, the whole concept of vicarious sacrifice will do no harm. Quite to the contrary, it will stimulate us to follow His example and deepen in us a love modelled on His.¹ Orthodoxy has no monopoly on this concept. It is simply Christian, and—to a certain extent—simply human. Only a man who does not want to be a Christian, a man who thinks of religion as a kind of market-affair, can degrade the idea of vicarious suffering to a level that is thoroughly unreligious and thus entirely unacceptable.

(c) There remains the worst charge: that sacrifice presupposes

¹As is well known, this is the line taken by Abelard, Anselm's opponent, and by all his followers down to Ritschl in his *Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation* or Hastings Rashdall's book on *The Idea of Atonement in Christian Theology*.

the crude pagan notion of a wrathful Deity who must be placated by the shedding of blood. This charge has been one of the most serious criticisms which liberal religion has directed against orthodoxy. Without a doubt, both popular interpretation and official dogmatic formulas revel in the notion that blood, and nothing but blood, can atone for mankind's grave offenses and transgressions. Too easily they attribute to God qualities that are common among men. Notions of offended honor, of the impossibility for God to forgive *sola gratia* have prevailed in theology and belief. There is no doubt that liberalism in its various shades—Socinianism, the Enlightenment, Kant and Schleiermacher, Parker and Channing, Scholten and Troeltsch—has rendered a great service in putting its finger on the weak spot of the whole conception of a primitive, glowering Deity, to be placated by bloodshed of propitiatory and vicarious sacrifice. God must be thought of in other terms: God is unalterable, inexhaustible Love, creating and recreating worlds, knowing what clay we are made of, helping us to find the way of life which we cannot help seeking, infinitely above vengeance and wrath. It is this highly spiritual, more or less Platonic or Spinozistic concept of God, that has freed religion from all such relics of superstition, fear, anthropopathic narrow-mindedness, as might still cling to religion, even to the Christian religion. Great indeed this service may be called. And innumerable are the advantages it has brought to us.

Unitarianism and liberal religion on the whole have been built on this sunny clearness and abundant grace of light and love, flowing from the one and unique source of all Being, God, the World-Soul, the never changing and everlasting fount of all good. It is not for the purpose of lyrical enthusiasm that I sing the praise of the liberal concept of Deity, but rather to make clear that, nourished by morals and philosophy, our fundamental religious concept has become so transparent, so statically absolute, so glorious with nothing but light and love, that it leaves us helpless before the reality of life. We must not forget that in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the general outlook on life was optimistic; (and that religious liberals—who were most typical of that outlook—were supported by a general feeling in contemporary civilization that inclined in the same direction: expansion, evolu-

tion, spreading of intellectual education. . . .) But we are now confronted by an entirely different situation: western civilization fighting for its very existence, a collapse of ideals, and a rising tide of cynical realism. And that leaves us in a dark universe.

The more we cling to an exclusively rational and ethereal concept of Deity, the less that God has, or can have, in common with this world. This brings us back to a situation through which western man has already lived. Religion becomes a way of salvation leading from this dark world to loftier forms of life. This means much the same interpretation as neo-Platonism, or early and medieval Christianity. The disconcerting consequence of the absolute monism of spiritualistic religion would be a radical dualism between God and the world—a dualism of essentials, irremediably static, condemning both principles to reciprocal antagonism. The next step of course would then be the finding of a saviour or mediator, who would reconcile the opponents—*i.e.*, the reconstruction of that world “between heaven and earth,” which former centuries have so largely believed in, a world of angels and demons, ruled by either the prince of darkness, or by the *Redemptor mundi*. Such a renewal of dualism would mean the taking of more than one backward step into superstition and primitive religion. And, let us not forget, mind you—it would be the consequence of our one-sided, super-idealistic view of the universe as emanating from the source of light (for that emanation *from* light involves a flowing *into* darkness). The darker, the more chaotic our world would become, the more likely would be a repetition of this development in religion. In all this there would be nothing really new, but merely an analogous reaction to analogous presuppositions of previous centuries. And this would mean the end of liberal religion, in that it would completely reconstruct out of liberalism a primitive orthodoxy. So, if we wish a future for liberalism, we must take another course.

* * *

I find that course in taking up the idea of sacrifice and reconsidering it in the light of human experience and religious speculation. This is the place to indicate my indebtedness to Nicolai Berdiaev's book *The Meaning of History* (Scribner, 1936) for the following analysis.

Perhaps we might say, that the starting point is best chosen in the notion of "the living God." This Biblical term admirably expresses the actuality, the concrete interest, the loving alertness of God, over against the remoteness and aloofness, the abstract height and Stoic *apatheia* of most philosophic interpretations of God. Religion has something dramatic and dialogic about it. We might infer this from the central principle of liberal theology, "God is Love." For love, though sometimes a quiet lamp in a sacred and remote chapel, is more often and more essentially, active power, creating, helping, saving. So at least is God understood in the Gospels. I think it is but stating a simple truth, that the fundamental teaching of Jesus Christ is that of God's redeeming, saving, gracious Love; something active and dynamic. Although the concept of God's Personality sometimes shocks us—especially when used to secure petty advantages in daily life and for all-too-cozy relationships between God and man—there can be no doubt that if we refuse to recognize personality in God we must take care not to represent Deity as a sort of natural Force; for then we would make Him something less full and rich than man, which surely is not the intention. But we may well believe that in God there is a form of being which, although including personality, yet transcends it, and even perfects it in this higher form of being. Therefore what is highest in the personal existence of man cannot but have room in God's existence too—even if we are not able to "locate" it, so to speak. I have made this digression about personality, because I want my readers to infer from human experience the religious speculation, that God's love is self-sacrificing.

No special insistence should be necessary to make clear that the most personal relationship between human beings *is* that love which gives itself entirely, without reserve, and up to the end, for better or for worse. The images Jesus Christ uses in the Gospel of the seeking shepherd, the waiting Father, the generous landlord, permit no doubt about his concept of God's active, saving, gracious love. We may go further and say: if Deity is to be described as love, it surely must be the highest form of love, which is not only (nor even first and foremost) contemplative love, but active, dynamic, self-sacrificing love. Not charity as an incidental application, but love as the essential principle or fount

of all good, as the very core of God's Being, is the most adequate concept of His reality.

This, as Berdiaev points out, means that in God there is an internal drama which he calls the esoteric meaning of the trinitarian dogma, and which, although it has never been acknowledged in official church dogmatics, is still the unescapable consequence of the evangelical concept of the living and loving God. Berdiaev regards Father, Son, and Holy Ghost as symbols of an inner, unfathomable process or drama in God, by which God not so much redeems and saves the world or mankind, as Himself.

Love has in it not only the radiating and creative power of light, but also the dark side of suffering and dying. The concept of the dying God has a profound wisdom in it, and appeals to human thinking as well as feeling: the dying God is an ideogram for the enigmatic but undeniable fact, that life subsists by suffering, self-sacrifice, and death unto resurrection. This is not merely a fact, but also a principle of life (John XII: 24).

We might approach this truth from another angle. There is a primitive and strong religious feeling, that we, as well as all living creatures, depend upon the unknown and deep forces of life, as seen in nature. To a certain extent God is nature. At the same time there is a strong spiritual experience which indicates that God is another word for Spirit, the most ethereal essence of the world. Hence, the act of faith, the only true and really fundamental act of faith: God as nature and God as spirit are one. That unity, however, is nothing logical or straight-lined, but rather a mystery, involving a revision of values both ways. This reversion of values to maintain being, this self-sacrificing alternation of incarnation and "ecarnation" seems to me to be a speculative argument in favor of the Christian concept, that the living God gives *Himself* to feed, to save, to renew the world, His creation. If we insist on God's unity as immutability, we run the risk of missing this point. If, on the contrary, we assume that the love of God includes suffering, atonement, gracious redemption and salvation, we are far better able to interpret the depth of Christianity and the divine presence in Christ.

On one condition we must insist, however: that we do not try to explain this Presence in terms of ancient dogma. No specu-

lation on the two natures of Christ, no reverence for the virgin birth or the bodily resurrection can bring this mystery nearer to us. For it has nothing to do with birth or body, but only with spiritual insight into the meaning of deeds and the abundance of love.

But neither has this Presence anything to do with placation of God's wrath by the bloodshed of an innocent victim; which is a barbarous and blasphemous theory indeed—the miserable offspring of man's own troubled conscience. The reality of sacrifice is far more cheerful and simple and powerful than the vicarious slaughter of animals; it is the acme of love absolute, the turning point of time and eternity, incarnation and "ecarnation" in one and the same act.

Therefore, we affirm emphatically that liberal religion cannot continue to live on moralistic and social values alone (however precious they are); but that, if it is to be equal to the eternal facts of human and cosmic life, to satisfy the craving of human souls for communion with God in their sufferance and death, in guilt and sin, liberal religion must rethink this central concept of Christianity—a central concept in most religions—and must interpret this Truth in its own way, not hampered by unintelligible formulas of the past, not tied to intelligible but misguided and superficial criticisms of rationalism, but striding forward to interpret it as the incomparable symbol of the deepest, universal Love, in accordance with human experience and speculation. In this lies a supreme consolation in distress and a kindling inspiration to activity. God so loves the world that He gives Himself in each of us, as He did in Christ, to realize His purpose of Love, to bring the whole creation to the fullness and unspeakable bliss of His Being: God all in all.

Priest, Prophet and Proletariat

A Study in the Theology of Paul Tillich

GEORGE H. WILLIAMS

Unitarian and Universalist ministers commonly confront an apathy concerning liberal religion on the part of the young people of their congregation. These young people often enough have gone through the church school and the young people's group only in the end to leave the church with a shrug of the shoulders and with the self-satisfied conclusion that "the church has little to offer." This is sometimes the attitude even of the children of the old-line liberal families. They come to look upon religion simply as morality suffused with emotion and, feeling perfectly capable of their own moral direction, they see no reason for church attendance, unless it be for occasional delight in the lingering beauty of some of the old forms of worship; and for this purpose they regard the liturgical churches as more satisfactory than the free churches. Religion ceases to hold any power over them except for a very few who indeed frequently turn to the opposite scheme, embracing even the religion which their fathers struggled to throw off. But such converts to Roman Catholicism, Anglicanism, and Protestant orthodoxy, while notable, are few. More frequently the shift of attitude is evidenced only negatively by their willingness to marry Catholics and have their children brought up Catholic. Liberal ministers who are puzzled by the strange turn of temper and by the more commonly experienced indifference concerning religion among the youth of liberal families will find instruction in a very peculiar way from the writings of Paul Tillich, in which he propounds his theology of paradox. While Tillich does not deal with our problem directly, his thought may be readily applied to the problem of the generations within our denominational life and to the whole problem of a vital faith.

Religious life, like all life, is sustained, according to Tillich, by tension between opposites. As long as there prevailed a vivid picture of Hell in the imagination of the frontiersman, the teaching of universal salvation enjoyed a widespread appeal, but with the general decline of apprehension concerning eternal torment came also a subsidence in the enthusiasm for Universalism. Sim-

ilarly as long as Orthodoxy was Fundamentalist, Unitarianism appealed to the free-thinkers of all denominations who came over with the enthusiasm of joyful converts, but now that modernism characterizes the urban churches of most denominations the original appeal of Unitarian rationalism in religion has ebbed. The attraction of a denomination that demands no creed disappears when denominational creeds are all around falling into desuetude. Indeed, even some young people in the Unitarian denomination, long accustomed to the supposed virtue of creedlessness, have asked bitterly what the church stands for and what it means to be a member of it. Among these few young people, who have at least the merit of being religiously concerned, the freedom of religion is likely to be construed as nothing more than indifference toward religion, while the freedom for which their fathers struggled is even mocked as stodgy indecision and lack of commitment and no faith at all. In religion as in life a thing acquires significance by that with which it stands in contrast. The gathering of clouds is a welcome sight to the farmer whose lands have long been parched, but a sorry sight to him whose ground is sodden. Liberal religion, it would appear, can appeal principally to those who know it in contrast to orthodoxy and *who despite their intellectual shift of position remain conditioned by their previous Orthodoxy*. Liberal religion will be always understood by such converts as something warm and vital because it is seen in reference to Orthodoxy, while by their children who have never appreciated Orthodoxy it will tend to appear a dull flatness. Liberal religion lives best by contrast. It is, moreover, probably at its best when it is a saddened liberalism still cherishing in its memory, like an old homestead, that to which it can return no more.

The principle of contrast explains much of the movement in the history of religion as a whole. A tension between opposites has always been characteristic of vital religion: the tension between the negative and the positive, the fatherly and the motherly, the wrathful and the merciful, the sinful and the gracious. The one can be known only in contrast with its opposite. Religion thrives on this tension. Of all religions Christianity is perhaps the most paradoxical. Indeed, basic to it is the Hebrew-Hellenic conflict which has ever made for spiritual vitality. Whenever the

contrast has been ignored, the resulting one-sidedness has sooner or later ridden to its fall, to be corrected perhaps on the other side by an even greater excess. But it is in the maintenance of the paradoxical that religion remains vigorous. When the prophets declared that God requires only the contrite heart and not sacrifice else would they give it, they spoke in the terms of sacramental religion. What doth the Lord require of thee but to do justly and to walk humbly with thy God? These words were meaningful to the Jews who felt oppressed by the sacramental system. Nevertheless, they presumed that system; and religion, as long as it is vital, instinctively manages to retain something of the priestly without which the prophetic is empty and formless.

Related to the tension between the priestly and the prophetic is the tension between justice, the law, and God's wrath on the one side and lovingkindness and mercy on the other. The one presumes the other. When Jesus preached the gospel of love he assumed familiarity and respect for the Jewish law. He said to himself that he came to fulfil the Law, not to destroy it; and the instinct of the Church in retaining that which embodied the foil for his teaching, namely, the Old Testament, was sound. The religious man can know God's love and mercy only after he has known God's Law, His exactions, and His wrath.

Similarly when Paul exultantly proclaimed that the Good News is no other than the forgiveness of sins for all who are repentant and believe in Christ's sacrifice, he felt the joy of liberation. This religious joy must be understood against the background of a century-long conviction of the necessity of the Law and ceremonial works. Paul, the despairing and sin-conscious legalist, grasped at length and was himself grasped by the salvatory revelation of Christ's sacrifice. Moreover, the blithe and joyful designation of Christ as the Lamb of God can be understood in its original power and depth only by seeing it in contrast with what had gone before. The Lamb of God was in effect the symbol of the great discovery or disclosure that sacrifice was no longer necessary. We today for whom the offering up of sacrifices is not even a faint memory, find the image of the Lamb unusable, to say the least, but the religious reality of which it was the symbol should not escape us. The fact that the early Christians felt vaguely, despite

the Good News concerning the efficacy of simple faith, that they must retain the Jewish Law in the background is evidenced, insofar as they were Jewish, by their retention of much that was Jewish morality inherited from the Law and by their cultivation of it, insofar as they had been originally pagans. We know from Paul's letters to his non-Jewish converts that without the ballast of the Jewish Law they often became even flagrantly antinomian, for the Christian religion of faith could be at best only partially grasped without the background of the Law.

So it was that Christianity, on becoming the religion of the Gentile world, was obliged to fashion first of all an orderly world. The Catholic hierarchy and Catholic sacramentalism represent the historical response to this need. And thus it was that by the time of Luther the Catholic system had completed itself. Indeed it had become orderly and over-organized to a fault and hence oppressive as had Judaism in the days of Jesus. It was an example of the harmful excess of emphasizing only one side of religion. Luther's outburst against the sacramental system is comparable to that of Jesus and Paul over against legalistic Judaism. And like them Luther cannot be understood without this contrast vividly in mind, for his was the religious joy of a devout and conscientious, but ever dissatisfied, monk who was at last delivered from the bondage of works. But he still thought in terms of works. Just as the Christian pagans and Jews spoke of Jesus in the terms of animal sacrifice which they had transcended, so Luther spoke in terms of the penitential system which he had transcended through faith. But Luther's thunderous No to the "law" of sacrament, which may be isolated as *the* Protestant principle, did not long endure. For when his followers were freed from the Roman Church, they slavishly attached themselves to a new "law," whether it was the Bible, personal experience, or the writings of Luther himself.¹ Hence, much of that which is today based upon Luther is not peculiarly Protestant. According to Tillich, Lutheranism became Melancthonism, that is to say, Protestantism (whose spirit was protest in the sense of denying the possibility of man's ever having

¹Luther, it must be remembered, by no means confined himself to the Bible and he used the Bible itself very freely, regarding that as Scriptural which "drives" Christ into a man.

God in his grasp intellectually or sacramentally), settled down by necessity to the task of fashioning a church in which its truth could be expounded. But in effect the Protestant Church tended to become a little and often a much less beautiful and less effective Catholic Church, as authoritarian and self-absolutizing as that against which it had risen up in righteous indignation. Much as the first Roman churches were ugly structures made out of the broken parts of ruined pagan temples, so was the early Protestant Church as soon as its prophetic spirit left it, for then it was required to put together a church out of the larger fragments that still remained from their frenzied destruction of the sacramental church.

From the foregoing generalization concerning the relation between the prophetic and the priestly in the history of religion it is apparent that both are essential. We are sometimes inclined to consider the prophetic and the merciful elements as the fundamentally religious ones, holding before our view the classical prophets and the Sermon on the Mount. But the pilgrimages to Zion, the psalms in the Temple, and obedience to the Law of God are equally fundamental. The fact is that each is susceptible of worthless and even destructive excesses. It is in their dynamic union and interaction that religion is powerful and deep. Throughout the life of religion there must be, in view of the dynamic nature of God¹, an alternation between that outburst of grace which is prophecy thundering divine negation and that suffusion or realization of grace which is priestly and healing, proclaiming a triumphant and celebrative Yea over man's life and draping itself in religious forms like the cultus and the law.

Tillich thus distinguishes between two kinds of grace: between the warm, healing, sustaining, chthonic forces which are impounded by sacramentalism and the challenging, destructive-creative forces that are manifest in prophecy. He associates the former with the motherly element in the world and the latter with the fatherly element. Catholicism, absorbing and transforming the folk culture of whatever land it becomes established in, is full

¹Tillich's God is not the static unmoved mover of the Greeks but the dynamic Lord God of Hosts and the Providence of history known by the Hebrews.

of this sacramental, motherly substance that heals. Protestantism insofar as it is true to its principle is prophetic. Unfortunately, however, Protestantism has tended to lose its prophetic direction and has moreover been so stripped by the righteously zealous Reformers, notably Zwingli and Calvin, that it can only provide a comparatively small amount of the binding substance which our world so desperately needs. Whence it is that many despairing ones pass over to the Catholic Church even though the Church does almost nothing about the social and cultural problems of the day. Tillich believes that both the priestly and the prophetic forms of grace are necessary for a God-mindful, as he says, theonomous society. Today, however, there is grave danger that Christianity will be sloughed off by society because society will despair of an institution that is not concerned with its problems. And yet should the Church go, with it would perish its vital store of that warm, sacramental, healing grace without which no enduring community can develop. Nor is Protestantism, denuded as it is, entirely lacking in the sacramental and binding grace. It still bears within itself some of the healing principle which it should endeavor to collect. But the Church must likewise be prophetic, true to its nature as *Protestantism*. Without the active participation of Protestantism in the concerns of the time, the prophetic outburst will otherwise be forced to break forth in a secular guise. But a secular prophetic upthrust will be only bitter, savage, and hard, resorting finally to a hollow political sacramentalism. Tillich cites as examples *Communism* and *Nazism*.

In analysing the relationship between the priestly and the prophetic Tillich shows, however, not only that the two alternate and set each other off, but also that these two expressions of grace correspond to two moods of civilization—the static and the dynamic. Like many other theological and philosophical thinkers today, Tillich distinguishes cultural traditions which are time-conscious and those which are space-minded. The Hebrews represent the former preeminently; the Greeks exemplify the latter. Christianity is in the fortunate position of being heir to both. Space cultures are bound to the land which becomes hallowed. Blood, soil, and race play a prominent rôle. In the religion of such cultures the priestly element predominates, for these cultures possess

no true conception of history. The Greeks, for example, had their chronicles but no "eventful" philosophy of history.¹ History occurs in cycles which, like the seasons, come and go only to return. Most cultures tend to be space-minded during the major portion of their duration. Jewish culture, however, in its formative period constituted a notable departure from space-bound, land-bound thinking for the Jews and their ancestors, the Hebrews, have always been characteristically detached from the soil. In their formative period they were a people bound together by a Covenant to God and not by blood ties. They have been nomads, sojourners in the land, city dwellers, exiles, and world wanderers, seldom established long enough in one place to acquire an attachment to a particular locality and hence to become space-conscious. Indeed, whenever they have tended in this direction their prophetic blood has stirred, and at least some of their number have risen as prophets to shake the others out of their quiescence or complacency. Abraham led his family out of Ur, Moses led the tribes out of Egypt, the Josian reformers denounced the veneration at local shrines, and history destroyed thrice even the central shrine at Jerusalem, until finally the Jews became a history-conscious people, seeing the hand of the Almighty in the rise and decline of civilizations.² In this dynamic conception of God and time, the Eternal is thought of as breaking into history, but elusively, so that God can be pointed to only in his mighty works like the escape from Egypt and the giving of the Law. Judaism has always tried to resist the attempt to objectify God; it has been savage in its attack on graven images, for it has grasped the inexhaustibility of God who moves in mysterious ways, rocking and shaking history by His decrees.

¹Tillich distinguishes between *Geschichte*, in which something new and truly eventful *geschieht*, and *Historie* in which there is no conception of the eventfulness.

²Tillich remarks, however, that Judaism today shows a tendency to become space-bound, first through its espousal of Zionism and the return to a holy land and secondly through its loss of socially and prophetically-minded Jews (that is to say, the time-conscious or history-minded Jews) to the cause of Communism and hence their removal from the Jewish religious community. The fate of the remaining Jews has been to become space-minded to their own disadvantage through being forced by an actively or potentially hostile Gentile environment to stress sacramentalism and to enforce racialism.

In the dynamic understanding of God and history, first vouchsafed to the Hebrews, Tillich sees existence torn from out its spatial bondage and given an irreversible direction which results in the intensification of existence, for time thus presents potentialities or tensions between what is and what might be, so that through the exercise of free choice something new can be brought forth. That is to say, man is fated to be what and where he is, yet time holds him in a tension between this necessity and the potentiality of exercising free choice to loosen the tension in a creative direction, with the result that something truly eventful occurs. Being is thus made meaningful through the creation of the new. Space-thinking, in contrast, fails to recognize the possibilities inherent in time, so that a completely sacramental society merely unfolds, it never makes saltations. Consequently, in its cumbersome unfolding whole sections of a society may be blindly rolled upon and crushed, and yet this destruction will be defended sacramentally, that is, the priests will deplore the plight and yet maintain that it must be for so it has always been. It is the prophet who rises up and declares that something new can be created which will *preserve* and yet *correct* the religion-culture. The prophet is impelled by the realization that the Eternal breaks through sometimes even to destroy, in order to create new forms. In the prophetic sense of time there prevails no simple contrast between the Eternal and time, for the prophet views the Eternal as significant in time and not above time. The Eternal is the bearer of time. Thus all time, past, present, and future, has a transcendent reference, of which, however, only the prophetically-minded are keenly conscious. All moments of time are alike significant and insignificant; they are all borne and shattered by the Eternal. Accordingly there is in time-thinking or, theologically expressed, in eschatological thinking, the hope that through being shattered by the Almighty, society may assume God-mindful or God-filled forms and thereby become a more nearly perfect symbol of Eternity.

A society is especially in need of the prophetic voice and vision when history passes into a crisis. An historical situation contains the potentiality of significant mutation, that is to say it is dialectic, when it produces within itself from inner structural necessity, con-

traditions which can lead, with the aid of human decision, to some new situation in which the contradictions can be resolved. Freedom and necessity are thus the warp and woof of man's decision. If man does not accept the responsibility, the decree or demand remains unfulfilled, and things begin again from the beginning to arrive at the same goal, while the tendencies or potentialities provided by the historical process remain unused. Whoever destroys this union between dialectic necessity and human freedom, misses the import of our historical existence. This, however, is precisely what space-thinking fails to grasp.

We turn from our consideration of the relation between space-thinking and time-thinking in respect to the two cultures which have entered into the Christian tradition, to work out some of the implications for religious knowledge. Within the Christian development Tillich distinguishes three fundamental approaches, two of which are not dynamic, in other words they are more under the influences of Greece than of Palestine. The medieval Catholic way holds the Object of the religious quest to be not only static but also superrational. God is the Supernatural who vouchsafes to man through revelation the materials which he is then free to work over and systematize by means of reason. There is secondly the classical, humanist approach which likewise holds its Object or Absolute to be static. The humanist approach differs from the Catholic, however, in regarding the Absolute as accessible to reason without any form of revelation, grace, or intuition. The humanist regards his own vantage point as absolute and assumes that God can be conceived as the highest synthesis of human thought, the Ideal. Both of these static approaches tend to deny that knowledge is in time. Thirdly there is the approach which Tillich himself follows as a result of his dynamic time-consciousness, and for which he appropriates the designation "Protestant," because Luther made such distinguished use of it.¹ The "Protestant" approach, in contrast to the humanist and Catholic, holds God to be dynamic and deeper than the reaches of reason. Like the Catholic, however, the "Protestant" recognizes that God is beyond reason, not however as the Supernatural but as the Para-

¹In this powerful, though slender, tradition are to be found in addition to Luther and the prophets, also Duns Scotus, Boehme, and the later Schelling.

doxical. The "Protestant" epistemology, according to Tillich, recognizes that man's knowledge must be ever limited by his historical situation, by his place in time. Man can never behold the truth shimmering in an Above or Beyond apart from historical exigencies. It is therefore presumptuous to assume, as do classicism and Catholicism, that man can think timelessly. At most it may be vouchsafed to him to glimpse the Transcendent in time. Tillich denotes the gulf between the dynamic tradition in theology and philosophy as over against the two static traditions, along with their mystical variants¹, by fashioning the concept of Kairos and setting it over against Logos. Logos is the concept of the Eternal Truth for which both Catholic and classicist philosopher seek. Kairos, which is not exactly a coordinate term, is the fullness of time which demands decision for or against the Eternal. The quest of the dynamic tradition in terms of the static traditions is thus to grasp the Logos in Kairos. "Protestantism" quests for the Eternal One that moves while Catholicism and classicism seek to distinguish a static One in the flux of the many.

Tillich asserts that the "Protestant" position is a peripheral position. That is to say, the dynamic thinker is the one who finds himself on the frontier in contrast to the center.² The humanist and the Catholic work from the center out. They seldom feel the challenge of other thought complexes. The "Protestant" is a critic, a prophet. Luther stood on this side of the completion of the Catholic system and was thus in a position to criticize it. Luther came to know Catholicism as it was about to pass over its own border. From the border he was thus able to give Protestantism all the fundamental thoughts. Similarly the great prophets worked out all the battle-positions for the Hebrew world.

It is this dynamic Protestant-Hebrew "on-the-boundary" situation which gives rise to truly prophetic criticism. The prophet is

¹Both Catholicism and classicism or humanism can have their mystical forms.

²Tillich himself is preeminently a "Protestant," for he stands or has stood on many borders; between country and city; between pre-war thought and post-war thought, between socialism and Lutheranism, between the Old World and the New. In his autobiographical section in *The Interpretation of History*, Tillich considers himself, moreover, on the boundary between philosophy and religious experience. The task of the theologian, he asserts, is to mediate between the conceptual world of philosophy and the experiential world of religion. Theology he defines as theonomous metaphysics.

gripped by and grasps the demands of the Transcendent for his particular time. In his interpretation of the Will of God, the prophet must of course resort to the forms of rational criticism, which provides the critical vocabulary. Tillich's distinction between rational and prophetic criticism, therefore, must not be taken as a denial of a relationship. Indeed at their best the two interpenetrate each other entirely; in rational criticism the prophetic becomes concrete, while in prophetic criticism the rational gains depth and power.¹

The prophetically-minded Protestant, the true Protestant according to Tillich, is thus confronted with the task of making decisions—decisions for the Eternal in time. For the historical situation which requires our affirmative decision and action in order to move forward Tillich employs the special word already introduced, Kairos, the fulness of time which demands decision and creation. In reference to the fulness of time the Eternal is designated the Eschaton which, without losing its transcendent character, stands both as a judgment against society and as a norm for a new one. Mytho-theologically expressed, the Eschaton is both the Kingdom, corresponding to the norm and fulfillment, and the Last Judgment, corresponding to the decision for the Kingdom or the judgment of man. Kairos is the fulness or bulging of time pregnant with the potentiality of bringing forth a more nearly perfect symbol of the Kingdom. Kairos is time confronted with the fulness of the Eternal and confronted therefore with the necessity of epoch-making decision. This fulness is apparent in the surging up of a new historical "form of grace." For the Transcendent Unconditioned, known in the language of devotion as God, expressing itself in time, must become manifest in some form. Even prophetic grace must take form, otherwise it

¹As a clarification it may, however, be pointed out that what passes for prophecy is not always true prophecy. In an autonomous or secularized society, like our own, the prophet is often confounded either with the visionary Utopian or the mere publicist, that is to say, with political critic or artistic observer who, however penetrating in his analysis, is blinded like his fellows, for without an awareness of the Transcendent, his is only the voice of a man, not the voice of the living God. Around Jeremiah there were not lacking those who were wise in the strategy of political alliances and the intrigues of the court, but they were only shrewd observers of the policy of the king, not prophets of the Law, for prophets put their trust in God.

cannot become manifest. Tillich asserts in this connection that the Reformers' understanding of grace went too far in destroying the Catholic idea of grace as a substance in form, although the Protestants were right in criticizing the absolutization of the Holy in sacred acts and objects. The truly Protestant position, corrected in the light of history, is, according to Tillich, that grace appears in forms although it can never be capsuled or enclosed in forms. By its nature it transcends forms. Thus he resorts to the expression "a form of grace," that is, a form in which grace works. Protestantism was once such a form, rendering thus the age of Reformation momentous. Our age is likewise especially "kairic" because the Transcendent is manifesting itself prophetically in the proletariat, which Tillich with astonishing directness calls a form of grace that comes to us in our dire historical necessity to give salvation to society. Kairos today is the historical occasion of the Eternal's creative-fateful break into time and history, in such a way that the Transcendent, manifesting itself within a rational form, the proletariat, confronts the Christian with the grace of social salvation, which brings with it an inescapable responsibility and a demand for an irrevocable decision for or against. And yet the Christian dare not objectify or absolutize that form, as does the Communist, lest it too become as onesided and monstrous as the capitalism against which it rises in righteous indignation. The proletariat is a force created out of the ailing society we know as capitalism to transform society. It dare not become an end in itself, however, without fateful consequences. It must serve an end greater than itself. Moreover as a prophetic form of grace it needs the healing priestly form of which the church still has a store. Tillich's great concern is that Christians and socialists should realize together that now is the hour of decision. His is the prophetic proclamation that the hour cometh and now is when Christianity and socialism must each grasp the significance of the other and, joining forces, give meaning to our time. For there comes a tide in the history of the West, which taken at the flood leads nearer to the Kingdom; omitted, all the voyage of our century will be bound in shallows and in miseries. The proletariat representing prophetic grace and the Church representing priestly or healing grace can together

make history, but divided they will witness the complete catastrophe of our century.¹

Thus far, as we observed at the outset, liberal religion has emphasized the negative side of religion, that is, the *no* to dogma and creed, accompanied by a tendency toward the prophetic in respect to society. Therefore, in view of the acute social and cultural problem of our age it must learn even more emphatically than before to thunder *no* to all man-made absolutes lest liberal religion in company with Protestantism in general become identified with the interests of the favored classes of the present order. It must thrust forward prophetically. But if it is to be a healing and binding influence it must also take stock of the priestly, sacramental, and celebrative element in religion which Protestantism in general and liberal Protestantism in particular have dangerously neglected. The vitalization of liberal religion will follow if it becomes aware of the dynamic priestly-prophetic union and interaction. Moreover, to consider again the weakness of the appeal of liberalism to youth with which we began our discussion, a stress upon the interpenetration of the prophetic and the sacramental will light up the contours of religion, reveal its complicated structure, and banish thereby the flatness which most of the young people of the liberal tradition associate with religion. This is of course to state a great truth in reference to the denomination, but we shall be off on the wrong foot unless it is taken at once for granted that the denomination can be considered only as one of the historically given instrumentalities of a vaster purpose—the transformation of American civilization which seems now to be destined to carry forward the historical mission of the West.

¹According to Tillich, the kairic moment has already been missed in Europe.

The Liberalism That Is Dead

THE EDITOR

Within the past two decades it has become a fad to criticize liberalism. Consequently, many liberals, in order to get a little peace, have resorted to the familiar method of sleeping on their good ear and exposing only the deaf one. But no alert liberal will, merely because of the fad, relinquish his duty to be critical concerning liberalism. Indeed, the criticism of liberalism from the *inside* is a necessity. It is the indispensable prerequisite to liberalism's fulfilment of its own mission and purpose.

When we speak of the liberalism that is dead we do so in the name, not of orthodoxy, but of the liberal principle itself—that nothing finite can be perfect or exempt from criticism. As liberals we assume that liberalism, like any other movement, can remain alive only through constant self-criticism, only through “coming to itself,” through repentance and “return.” Only where there is a sincere recognition of incompleteness and failure, only there are the spirit of liberalism and true religion to be found. Hence, the liberal expects to hear over and over again: Liberalism is dead, Long live liberalism. Indeed, the essence of liberalism can live only where “the liberalism that is dead” is identified and where the life that makes all things new is appropriated.

This life may be found, of course, within the traditions of liberalism itself; but liberalism has no monopoly upon the fount of life. Indeed, the clearest springs may be so far up in the mountains that our little systems and labels would appear artificial there, if not actually impertinent. The transcendent belongs to no party and it perennially eludes domestication. But this does not mean that we are helpless. We can at least prepare for the kingdom, if we cannot usher it in. And we have it on good authority that the preparation comes through repentance.

According to our reading of the history of liberalism the enervating elements in it, the elements which constitute the liberalism that is dead, are not the mere “accidents” of liberalism, having nothing to do with its essence. They are rather perversions of the very essence of liberalism. This we shall attempt to make clear, in the course of our analysis, by recalling the principles of liberalism which we ventured to set forth in the editorial of the previous issue.

Liberalism, it was said, depends first on the principle that revelation is continuous. This principle has served as the basis of the liberal criticism of authoritarian orthodoxies and has also made accessible to the liberals the new and broadening insights that have come from the study of other religions and from the employment of the scientific method. But all has not been pure gain. The expansive, assimilative tendency of liberalism which has enriched it has also flattened it out into a vague, indefinite *omnium gatherum* of watered-down truths selected at random from the various religious traditions and secular movements which have happened to elicit attention. The belief in the so-called "wider view" which transcends all particular traditions has in many cases resulted only in an amorphous, mystical secularism and has produced a liberalism which possesses no indigenous tradition, literature, or language. It has even detached many people from Christianity, the one tradition which they have some capacity for knowing from the inside. Consequently, though much of contemporary liberalism is cosmopolitan and comprehensive (and we should hope it will continue to be so), it is at the same time rootless and lacking in that concentration which alone can give it distinction and character. For this reason, it is difficult for many people to see what difference it makes to be a liberal. No particular body of religious literature, no religious language is recognized as characteristic of religious liberalism; and no set of disciplines is generally considered to be incumbent upon the adherent of our faith.

We are making no plea here for uniformity or for a faith once for all delivered, but rather a plea for a religious liberalism which, though permitting and encouraging variety and breadth, will acquire a precise character, a cutting edge of its own. In the last analysis, this means that liberalism, if it is to be effective in the arena of competing world-views today, must know pretty definitely what its convictions are and expect at least its own adherents to take them seriously. Only in this way can it offer more than a "search for the truth" and confront men with a "call," a demand, which comes to them with compulsion and urgency. We conclude, then, that the liberalism which is dead is the liberalism for which *all* religions are true and for which no *particular* religion is operative. This is what our orthodox critics have in mind

when they say that the liberal for whom everything is revelation is one for whom nothing is revelation.

Second, we have said that religious liberalism holds that "all relations between men ought ideally to rest on mutual free consent and not on coercion." Here again we have a principle without which religion (or society or politics) cannot be liberal. Yet, here too we have a principle which is very easily perverted into a justification for mere variety. Historically, this principle of liberalism has taken the form of confidence in the independent and individual conscience, coupled with what was really a belief in a "pre-established harmony." Hence, there developed a deeper regard for the microcosm than for the community. Specialization and rugged individualism became the order of the day. Industrial society was divided between chaos and monopoly. Life was broken up into compartments and the modern mind became a receptacle of repellent particles. The religious community became a tower of Babel and the liberal laity (generally) became almost as illiterate in matters religious as the laity of those authoritarian churches in which a man's understanding of his faith can be held by proxy and in which only the priest is familiar with the deposit of faith. All of these tendencies are perversions but also fruits of the doctrines of Francis Bacon, Adam Smith, and the young Schleiermacher.

Obviously, a liberalism which is alive cannot be hostile to the variety that enriches, but the variety that makes only for provincialism and fissiparous individualism is merely the prelude to disillusionment and to a yearning for authoritarianism as a respite from isolation and futility. The void which atomistic individualism creates is inevitably filled by the fury of an uncritical mass-mindedness. In short, the liberalism of mere individualism is not only dead, it is also the breeder of unholy desires for the efficiency of the ant-hill.

Thirdly, we have said that liberalism involves the moral obligation to direct one's efforts towards the establishment of democratic community. The perversion of this aspect of liberalism is due, more than to anything else, to the "acute secularization" of the ideal. The pseudo-liberal does not renounce the democratic faith; he simply considers democracy to be practically achieved (for

the middle class) and he only bemoans the decline of rugged individualism. Probably the point at which this deadening sort of liberalism most effectively blunts the force of prophetically religious liberalism is in its theory of liberal thought, what we shall call its theory of the immaculate conception of ideas. This is the belief that the liberal possesses a rational faculty by means of which he searches for truth and secures a "detached" view of the world, life, and God.

As a matter of fact, however, the average liberal's thought processes, "rational" though they be, are largely conditioned by his social status. He sees what it is to his interest to see. The sharecropper out of sight is out of mind. The most radical criticisms of this liberal doctrine of the immaculate conception of ideas have come to us perhaps from Nietzsche, Marx, and Freud. For Nietzsche the body (and the will to power) is the big reason and the mind (the little reason) is its instrument. For Freud, the reason is the tool of the subconscious libido, and for Marx the intellectual efforts of the liberal provide only an ideological smoke-screen whereby he conceals his real (economic) interests. The liberalism which is not aware of these criticisms of "liberalistic" thinking is dead. It is only living on the accrued interest of successful manipulation.

Of course, the Nietzschean, or Freudian, or Marxian cannot accept his own theory without qualifications. Otherwise, he would simply replace the doctrine of the immaculate conception of ideas by the doctrine of the total depravity of thought, not excluding his own. The liberal is thus not called upon to surrender the validity of all thought and reason. But the religious liberalism which is to live will have to produce a moral and intellectual force which can ferret out and oppose the kind of "liberalistic thinking" which by specious appeal to the rights of the individual (and by comfortable neglect of his duties) obstructs the growth of democratic community.

Fourthly, we have said that liberalism holds that the resources (human and divine) which are available for the achievement of meaningful change justify an attitude of ultimate optimism. Indeed, we have argued that the orthodox really share this view with the liberals. But what with the liberal's confidence in freedom

of inquiry and in the "detached" reason, liberalism has perverted this optimism into an unwarranted reliance upon education, that is, education without conversion, without commitment. Yet, education which does not affect the will as well as the mind, only gives the power-seeking, unregenerate will a greater efficiency. The liberalism that is dead is the liberalism that does not call for decision, that does not see that the divine spark in man rises into flame only through the recognition of the need for a change of heart, a change which produces a scepticism concerning one's own self-sufficiency and innate divinity. The liberalism that is alive is the liberalism that changes men and reveals to them the distance between man and God, giving them, in the words of George Tyrrell, an ultimate optimism, but an optimism based upon an immediate pessimism.

Chronicle

J. BRYAN ALLIN

C. H. Faust, "The Background of the Unitarian Opposition to Transcendentalism," *Modern Philology*, Feb. 1938. Professor Faust of the University of Chicago discusses the controversy that raged in New England from about 1815 until about 1845. The issues as they were stated by a staunch Calvinist or "Orthodox" were: First, Biblical interpretation; second, the transference of religious problems from theology to rationalistic philosophy with the consequent manhandling of dogmas; third, the question of *tendency*, the main question being "which of the two systems, the Unitarian or the Orthodox, is of superior tendency to form an elevated religion." The Calvinists charged that Unitarianism encouraged infidelity by denying the final authority of the Bible. Goaded by this charge and by the charge that Unitarianism was merely negative, Unitarians sought to show that by ridding themselves of the impedimenta of orthodox religions they were able to present "the only barrier against . . . a deadening disbelief . ." The Orthodox also charged that Unitarians were "treading in the steps of the German heretics," to which one reviewer replied that he did not think that he should be deterred from inquiry because the learning of Germany was monstrous and hasty. The Unitarians charged their opponents with exclusiveness and maintained that "free inquiry is a fundamental principle," none the less they repeatedly declared their confidence in the Bible's supernatural authority. In 1823 William Peabody wrote explicitly, "We bring every doctrine and every duty to the test of the Scriptures." "By 1835 the chief points in the Orthodox attack on Unitarianism had often been stated and elaborated; they had, too, often been answered." The controversy might have subsided had not Emerson and Parker assumed positions which seemed to the "Orthodox" to justify their predictions. There is no need here to review the conflict but it might not be inappropriate to remember that Parker, although he was not expelled from the American Unitarian Association, was completely snubbed by his brethren because, to paraphrase Mr. Justice Holmes, he adhered rather more rigorously than the rest of them did to the tenets on which they thought they were acting. The object of Professor Faust's wholly admirable article is to reveal the historical reasons for the bitterness they then evinced.

Henry Nash Smith, "Emerson's Problem of Vocation," *The New England Quarterly*, March, 1939. In a remarkably fine essay Mr. Smith discusses Emerson's quest for a vocation suited to his character. "As a rule," he writes, "one can detect in Emerson's writing on the subject an original tension or conflict of impulses arising from his inability to satisfy simultaneously the conventions of his youth, the demands of the humanitarians, his own temperamental inclination, and the ethical ideals of English Romanticism." Before he arrived at the doctrine of self-reliance he had "created, tested and abandoned a whole company of characters, such as the Man of Genius, the Seer, the Contemplative Man, the Student, the

Transcendentalist." The first stumbling-block in his search for "vocation" was that others had decided, "before he knew the character of his own mind," that Emerson should be a minister. But having renounced the ministry he was beset by new problems. Militant humanitarianism replaced the clerical tradition as the most alarming threat of the outer world to impose restraint upon Emerson's career of self-realization." Whereas before he had been struggling against the established order, his most formidable opponents now were more opposed to it than he. In the end Emerson seceded not only from the church but also from the state and he was thus forced to conceive not only "a new vocation for himself but almost a new society." Mr. Smith concludes with the suggestion that in this experience Emerson found new themes for his art. One cannot too highly recommend this article.

Harry H. Clark, "Dr. Holmes: A Reinterpretation," *New England Quarterly*, March, 1939. One side of Holmes, says Professor Clark, "perhaps represents better than any other of our nineteenth-century figures one of the most momentous conflicts of the age, the conflict between religion of a Calvinistic cast and science." He combined sentimentalism and humanitarianism with scientific rationalism. As he reflected on the problem of evil his humanitarianism led him to conclude that, "a God responsible for suffering could not be a God." His scientific rationalism made him believe in progress based on Darwinianism and scorn past experience and tradition as an ethical guide. Though he remained a traditionalist in social affairs, politics, and literature he foreshadowed by his scientific attitude the work of modern criminologists.

Russel B. Nye, "The Religion of George Bancroft," *The Journal of Religion*, July, 1939. When Bancroft went to Germany in 1818 he intended to study theology and to preach. He studied theology and philosophy and although he had to give up the ministry he had learned of transcendentalism at its source and his theological ideas influenced all of his writing. Bancroft thought that since God has chosen man as the receptacle of reason, and that since he possesses conscience, love for his fellow-men and an innate sense of beauty and that "since these attributes are common to all men, it follows that the common people compose the highest earthly tribunal in matters of government, art and religion." Because of his reason man can "unerringly discern the truth," because God dwells in man we have the promise of progress. Through reason man can also bridge the gap between the finite and the infinite, transcend matter and see the changless behind the changing. These are some of the elements of his religious faith which "forms the core of his approach to history." Mr. Nye says that although it is difficult to assign Bancroft to a definite creed it is a mistake to regard him as a Unitarian. Bancroft always considered himself a Congregationalist and he believed both in the divinity of Christ and in Trinitarianism. I conclude on a footnote. Bancroft was brought up a Congregationalist, paid for a pew in the Unitarian church in Washington, and always attended St. John's Episcopal Church in Washington at Christmas and Easter. Above all he was a democrat.

Book Reviews

A HISTORY OF RELIGIOUS LIBERALISM IN EUROPE¹

European religious liberalism has long needed just such a comprehensive survey as is here offered us. This is not to say that liberalism as a movement is finished or dead. Nevertheless the author of this history of religious liberalism which has recently been published in Switzerland is correct in stating that at present liberalism has come to an end, an end which is not, however, an expiration but rather a period of slackness. The Christian religion, so far as it is dynamic, both needs and begets liberalism and a carefully conceived individualism. Liberalism is based upon that mental tension to which the sincerely devout person is sensitive, a tension between the Bible, the ancient fathers and the Reformation on the one side, and himself on the other. The liberal consciously affirms this tension and acquires his very character through it; he does not wish to resolve it entirely, but rather recognizes that it will never cease and that it will ever adopt new forms. He is convinced that he, as well as Christianity as a whole, takes his life-energies from that inner tension. In other words, liberalism takes its root in a continuing comparison of all possible denominational attitudes. Indeed, I might say it is "Comparative Christianity." If now and then for some reason this comparative element is ignored and the seminal and evolutionary character of Christianity is no longer appreciated or discussed, then liberalism is enervated. Such a period of stagnation seems to have arrived—on this point we may agree with the author. It is the liberal versatility of Goethe's Faust that makes him promise Mephistopheles:

"If I should ever to the moment say,

'Linger then! Thou art so fair!'

Clap me into fetters then and there. . . ."

The beginning of European liberalism Dr. Nigg sees in the humanism of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. After dealing with this, he turns to the Reformation, taking up Socinianism and Spiritualism as "predecessors" and then proceeds to the "founders," the leading men of the Enlightenment (in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries) and of Idealism in the nineteenth century. Then he speaks of the flowering out (*Blütezeit*) of liberalism which he associates with the rising theological criticism and the formation of associations of liberals which brought about the ill-famed heresy "cases" in the different German provincial churches. Here the liberals encountered the institutional pressures which are always exercised by the state-organized and state-controlled church. One chapter is devoted to the struggle about the so-called Apostolic Creed and another to the "Outsiders," that is, to those figures who do not fit into the general framework of religious liberalism and therefore reach only a small circle of people, men of a romantically modernizing type such as Paul de Lagarde,

¹GESCHICHTE DES RELIGIÖSEN LIBERALISMUS. Entstehung, Blütezeit, Ausklang. By Walter Nigg. Zurich: Max Niehaus, 1937. 422 pp. RM 8.

Kalthoof, Bonus, Johannes Müller. In the next section of the book we are introduced to the judicious critics of the liberalism of their time who both from the left and the right directed a barrage-fire against liberalism; from the right, Kübel, Kuyper, Stöcker, from the left, Strauss, Overbeck, Eduard von Hartmann. Chapters on Catholic modernism and Reformed Judaism conclude the description of the struggle for religious freedom, the movements of monism and religious socialism being dealt with as symptoms of decline, tending toward the thorough decadence of liberalism after the World War.

On the whole, the author's style is agreeable and the reader soon becomes aware of the fact that he is under the guidance of an unbiased expert; indeed, one would willingly consent to becoming acquainted with a larger number of the Swiss liberals who are the author's countrymen. It may be remarked that the origin of the "Protestanten-Verein" and the roles played by its founder R. Rothe and by Schenkel in the early years of that movement, have been delineated in a capital way. Some questions may, however, be asked. Why did Nigg not grant a larger place to the Renaissance when treating the forerunners of liberalism? It is hardly sufficient to enter into a dispute with Jacob Burckhardt's singular and debatable opinions on this matter instead of positively discussing the significance of the Renaissance for Christian liberalism and individualism, explaining the various motives which influenced the men of that time from so many sides. I think it would have been advantageous for the elucidation of the earlier period of liberalism treated in this volume as well as for the gaining of a clear definition of what liberalism is in this connection, if the author had made a detailed study of the Renaissance, the age from which he himself derives the liberalism of our own age. Not even the fact that the author limits himself to treating German-speaking liberalism—and the failure to indicate this in the title is a serious omission—serves as an excuse for the other omission just mentioned. The reader will sometimes be inclined to deplore the requirement of brevity laid upon the author. However, that requirement will not justify the fact that so many names and figures are left out. Most notable among the figures unmentioned are: Chr. Gottl. Schaumann, J. A. L. Richter, Sueskind, Tieftrunk, Wilh. Traugott Krug, Heringa, Nicolai, representatives of the Perfectionists (besides Teller) as path-markers, and among later figures, Kawerau, Jr., Walter Frühauf, Chr. Weisse, Gressman, Volz, and Ludwig von Gerdtel. The Meadville Theological School.

KARL BETH.

LIBERAL CHRISTIANITY CAN SPEAK POSITIVELY

Prof. Dr. G. J. Heering, Director of the Remonstrant Seminary and Professor of Christian Dogmatics at the University of Leiden, Holland, reveals to us in this short essay,¹ delivered first as an address to students,

¹DE KRACHT VAN HET GELOOF. By Prof. Dr. G. J. Heering. Utrecht: V. C. J. C., 1936.

the positive faith which has taken possession of his life, its content and power. Although tolerant of the opinions of others as a liberal, the writer is thereby none the less dogmatic or convinced of the truth of his own faith. Rather, he speaks boldly as an insider, one to whom God has spoken. In this essay one finds a valuable introduction to his thinking in the field of dogmatic theology, although he does not attempt to be apologetic or exhaustive, but simply inspiring and instructive. He describes to young men and women the importance of the content of the Christian faith, and shows the practice of that faith to be a source of heroic power in personal and social living.

Faith is the heart of all religion, says Dr. Heering. It is necessary because the certainty which we seek in religion is of a realm of which no knowledge, in the usual sense, is possible. Objective certainty in religion is impossible except by faith. Faith is not won, but given by God. Faith, then, becomes identical with revelation or grace. "There is no faith without revelation, and no revelation comes to us other than through faith." Faith comes most easily to those who are yearning for God, yet the yearning is the first touch of God, so faith remains grace. For the outsider, he admits, this kind of faith involves great risk, the putting of one's life upon this one card of faith, but for the insider there is no risk because he *knows* and feels himself *compelled*. Prof. Heering is an insider, and for him the goal of good Christians is to submit to revelation and enter this closed circle of faith, and once having entered they will experience more and more fully the resultant power.

Prof. Heering then proceeds to point out clearly in seven points the content of the Christian faith for him. It rests upon the revelation of God in Jesus Christ, a Person, as He speaks to us in the Gospel, and also upon the mystical relationship between personal God and man. God's sovereignty is absolute. God's love directs itself to man, and receptivity to that love naturally slumbers within every man. Therefore human life is holy. We human beings are called to be fellow-workers with God in preparing the Kingdom which is coming. He speaks of these truths as having grasped us, rather than that we have grasped them, truths which are valid *revelations*.

His section on the psychological power of this absolute faith over the individual who is grasped by it is more convincing than his Dogmatic. The power of faith is that in faith God is with us; we are not alone; we stand in the truth which gives meaning and purpose to life. God has begun his work by giving us faith. He will finish it.

The essay is commendable above all for the deep religious insight and conviction displayed, although in stating such positive beliefs so vigorously one wonders how the author maintains a basis for a tolerant attitude towards his liberal comrades of differing opinions. Many of the problems touched upon in this essay are more fully elaborated in his two-volume work, *Geloof en Openbaring (Faith and Revelation)*.

The People's Liberal Church in Englewood, Chicago.

DONALD HARRINGTON.

OBLIGATION IN CHRISTIAN ETHICS

In a book which is important as a prolegomena to Contemporary Christian Ethics¹, Mr. L. A. Garrard, Tutor at Manchester College, Oxford, devotes Part I to the wider subject of the notion of obligation in moral philosophy generally.

We find first that obligation is not derived from the value of its consequences. This is urged against all philosophers who, from Plato down, have held that duties are duties because of their results. When this end-value is represented as happiness, it would be better to avoid calling it the "good," for this, strictly speaking, is an ethical term. When the end-value is itself moral goodness, this theory does not account for many simple duties in a direct enough way. And when the end-product is represented as value, taken as a genus of which happiness and goodness are species, there is the defect of ignoring personal relationships. Thus all ethical theories are disposed of which put the essence of obligation in the results of action.

In the second place, obligation is not derived from the goodness of an act. In the development of this thought, Mr. Garrard now disposes of the theories of Butler, Kant, and Martineau. These moral philosophers make an act's goodness depend upon the agent's purity of motive. They are in error because obligation is always centered upon the performance of an act. When motives are scrutinized, it is only that we may see more clearly what our obligation is. We must keep only the performance of an act in mind when we are considering the nature of obligation; and if they say that a pure motive is identical with a keen sense of duty they are only moving in a circle. Mr. Garrard grants that the desire to do our duty is probably the best motive for action; it is this very fact that shows there is such a thing as obligation apart from any motive.

With the two types of classical ethical theory disposed of, both of which have sought an objective factor common to all duties, the one in end-values and the other in the intrinsic goodness of an act, it remains to affirm that the only quality common to all actions which we ought to perform is that we think we ought to perform them. Obligation is *sui generis*, and the essence of all ethical obligation is our thought of its obligatoriness.

That, obviously, cannot be the end of the matter. It offers no standard of the rightness of an act. If that were all, the inquisitor's suppression of heretics would be for him obligatory. And so, if we do not misunderstand Mr. Garrard, it is. The inquisitor does what he thinks he ought. But it is the conscientious Englishman, we assume, who will take the next step: What man ought to do is based upon a calculus of claims. A "claim" is the status of an act which will become obligatory when the moment of its possible performance arrives. And the end-values which we had dismissed earlier now reappear as factors which make the claims stronger. These and the personal factors in a situation are the sources of claims upon us, and,

¹DUTY AND THE WILL OF GOD. By L. A. GARRARD, B.A., M.A. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1938. 250 pp. 12s. 6d.

when we cannot satisfy all claims, our obligation is to satisfy the strongest. We have, then, attained the imperative: *A man must do that action which appears to him to satisfy the greatest claim.* Notwithstanding what seems to this reviewer its stark relativity, this is the rule of action which Mr. Garrard lays down as "the true categorical" which alone has "absolute universal validity."

If, however, we ignore our speculative interest and look upon this imperative in its application to any actual moral situation, we can recognize its satisfactoriness. An alternative course would be to live in accordance with a list of moral laws such as the Decalogue or a table of natural rights. Mr. Garrard maintains the validity of his imperative against all such alternatives. He then closes Part I by identifying our obligation to meet the claims with the will of God. Thus, as with Martineau, all our obligations become obligations to God, who is, so to speak, the unifying Claimant. This identification gives a unique sanctity to the imperative, and, to speculative thinkers who believe in God, a harmonization of obligation with value.

The remainder of the book is historical and its significance could be appreciated fully by a specialist in Christian Ethics. Writing always with the care of a mature scholar delicately balancing the views of other scholars, Mr. Garrard examines, in Part II, most of the important contributions to the theory of obligation by Christian writers from the beginning to the present day. These chapters will fill a gap in the literature of the investigation of classical Christian moralists. Part III covers the same ground, but now from the point of view of the general nature of the moral situation. Here is presented history's contribution towards "a casuistry of claims" for the modern Christian.

The First Congregational Parish (Unitarian), Sharon, Mass.

ROWLAND GRAY-SMITH.

THEOLOGY AND SOCIOLOGY¹

We read this book with special interest, not only because of the content, but also because it was written by a professor in a theological school in Prague. Presumably the book and the author are now under the ban, as they both teach the gospel of love as set forth by Jesus.

The author's work takes up the familiar thesis that there is a close relation between theology and social ideology. While the writer ostensibly undertakes the task of tracing the influence of religion upon social service, he does much more. He brings social work into focus against the large background of social forces, and studies many economic concepts as they are related to his problem.

Dr. Hník agrees substantially with Ernst Troeltsch in his interpretation of religious phenomena, believing that religion has a dialectic of its own and

¹THE PHILANTHROPIC MOTIVE IN CHRISTIANITY. An analysis of the relations between Theology and Social Service. By Frank M. Hník, Ph.D., Reader in Christian Sociology and Ethics in the John Hus Theological Faculty, Prague. Translated from the Czech by M. and R. Weatherall. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1938. 339 pp. 16s.

is not wholly dependent upon economic and social forces. Like Troeltsch he would refute the Marxian doctrine of materialistic determinism, upholding the thesis that movements of church history arise primarily from within the ecclesiastical and theological framework.

The author traces the motive for what the translators call "social charity," from the days of Jesus to modern times. After setting up the statement of "love to God and man as the norm," he shows how this has undergone certain changes during different periods of church history. Interesting analyses are made of such figures as Thomas Aquinas, Martin Luther, John Calvin, William Ellery Channing, and others as they have influenced the philanthropic motive. Each is criticized and found wanting in some respect, modern humanitarian liberals failing in giving a systematic framework of theology to their philanthropic passion. He here makes the mistake of listing John Haynes Holmes as an "atheistic humanist."

The last chapters of the work have to do with the remarkable new Czechoslovak Church, in which the author finds for the first time in Christian history after the first century, a proper blending of love to God and love to man as motives in scientific and adequate social work. The Tufts College School of Religion.

CLARENCE R. SKINNER.

A SIGNPOST IN THE MAELSTROM¹

Grace Stuart is the wife of an English Unitarian clergyman, and this book has already run through six editions. Drawing upon the ideas and theories of certain of the leading psychologists, she achieves a sound intellectual synthesis and thus provides us with a valuable study of "the making of personality by, and for, relationship."

Beginning with the basic problem, *What is Life?*, Mrs. Stuart proceeds to depict man as a creature that needs love. She affirms the reality of a love force which is something beyond, something greater than man, something divine, that continually calls men. This force is therefore not to be confused with sex love, as so many have done in their interpretation of Freud. This great emergent force or value is inexhaustible—the very meaning and core of life. Or, as von Hügel expresses it, "Caring is the biggest thing out." There is something more for us to grow up into, something that fits our never-finished, always-growing self.

Psychologists demand a master sentiment as a focal point in man's life—a magnet pole for the centering of man's affections and loyalties. Man is by nature a hero-worshiper. Strangely enough, psychologists admit the worth of a religious life motive, though they affirm not the reality of God. Freud says that religion is an illusion. Yet he says that Christianity was wise in building itself about the personality of Christ, for man desires and needs such polarization. Jung suggests that the Christian faith in God is one of the most healing influences he knows. In the same breath he says

¹THE ACHIEVEMENT OF PERSONALITY. By Grace Stuart. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1938. \$1.75. 192 pp.

that it is an illusion, an illusion which will not work if once the patient is undeceived.

But we do not want a religion that deceives us even for our own good. We hope we have reached an adulthood from which we can face the world and life as they are. In the realization of our adulthood, we come to know that there are no hard and fast answers to the problems that confront us. We do know, however, that love without works is dead and works without love are futile. Mrs. Stuart says it is the strategy of reality which is forcing us to such a discovery. In a world destitute of love this book needs to be widely read.

The Grosse Pointe Unitarian Church.

MERRILL OTIS BATES.

THE CHAINS OF TIME

Chains bind: but mayhap the more important factor in the situation is not so much the binding as what it is one is bound to.

Mr. E. G. Lee, an English Unitarian minister, in setting the religious mysticism of Christianity in opposition to the secular mysticisms of Communism and Fascism, has sought, in a recent book,¹ to strike the chains of Christian dogma from Theism. This is a commendable and traditional Unitarian enterprise. Mr. Lee's essay is particularly individual, however, in its endeavor to free man from time and tide and to answer the contemporary secular heresies of Communism and Fascism upon the ground of their own mysticisms. These fail to sustain when confronted with "the solitary soul faced with its own destiny and found within its own mystery."

"Religious mysticism," says Mr. Lee, "contains a sense of unity in time expressed in history, and secular mysticism contains this also." There is achieved in mysticism a time-binding unity which answers to the mystery of the unity of the human spirit; not only in what has been and is, but in what is to come. But the secular religions of Communism and Fascism can not do justice to the fact and mystery of man's interior life. And this impotence is primarily due to the fact that they lack God: "In secular mysticism there is no exterior life that can give strength to the self." Whereas: "Religious mysticism apprehends a Life, a Being, a Presence, understood if need be through the terms of personality, or if need be beyond those terms, that offers a solution to the problems of the self."

Secular mysticism leaves man chained to time, and history with nothing beyond it becomes a prison house from which the spirit of man can find no release. For Communism and Fascism, reprieve or pardon for the shackled soul is impossible; for God, everything is possible. "No man," says Mr. Lee, "can live poised in time without speculating on the whence and whither." But "chained to Time man only becomes a creature of more or less, according to his ability to insulate himself from thought about the whence and whither."

¹CHRISTIANITY IN CHAINS. By E. G. Lee. New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1939. 143 pp. \$2.00.

To become more than "a creature of more or less," man must progress through secular mysticism to religious mysticism. "To be really free, to be charged with purpose, he must be able to give his spirit wings, and to survey from the height of his approach to the Divine the march of history through Time." "The spirit can set itself free from its habitat, and, entering into a union with a life that is above time, perceive from the depths and will of that life the complete oneness of opposites that historic circumstance seems to make."

"Only from the viewpoint of religion," Mr. Lee further declares, "and a religion that enters into the mysticism of eternal life and life with God, can the inherent contradictions of purpose in Time be solved; only in a union with a greatness that can hold within itself the major contradictions of necessity and freedom, and overarch those contradictions in the completeness and majesty of its own reality, can the soul set itself free from the crushing battle that must take place if left to its own solitariness."

If calling the whence and the whither "the eternal" and then throwing it into the lap of God resolves any contradictions for anyone, well and good. But can the chains of time dissolve as easily as contradictions seem to resolve? "The last reach and search of all creative activity" may well be, as Mr. Lee asserts, "escape from the pitiful shadow of the passing into the light of the eternal." But then what? especially if that creative activity is to take place in Time. "Once this vision has been attained then the purpose of man is to give that vision actuality in Time."

What? The light of the eternal to gain actuality in the pitiful shadow of the passing? Is, then, Eternity itself shackled to Time? Man's work, at least, must be accomplished while bound to time, so why not humbly accept the shackles? Remembering that though chains bind, mayhap the more important factor is what one is bound to.

The First Unitarian Society in Keokuk.

ANDREW X. MAHY.

A UNITARIAN NOVELIST¹

Edward Dodge is the pseudonym for E. G. Lee, the Unitarian minister in Leeds, England, and this delicate and sensitive novel augurs well for his literary future. The theme is the same as that treated so realistically by Thomas Hardy in *Jude the Obscure*—the craving of a boy, born into a drab and lowly environment, for "the freedom of the commonwealth of culture," symbolized by college and university; and the defeat of his dreams, not only by economic obstacles, but even more completely and finally through the betrayal of the flesh. But while the effectiveness of Hardy's grim picture was vitiated by a too-deliberate and arbitrary stacking of the cards against his hero, this novel carries conviction in every page. There is no distortion, no building up of a malignant figure of external fate to defeat a legitimate and praiseworthy human end, no single false note of forced

¹THE FLESHLY SCREEN. By Edward Dodge. London: Faber & Faber, 1937. 305pp. 7/6.

irony. The writing is quiet, and the atmosphere of tragedy is achieved by understatement.

Peter Pedlar is a boy with possibilities. His intelligence is above the average, and his curiosity about life is quickened by the quiet words and example of his schoolmaster. Adolescence brings with it a mental awakening, driving him to the library whence he emerges with Carlyle's *French Revolution*, but it also brings a keen interest in the opposite sex, and throughout the book there is the struggle between physical desires and the scholarly ideal.

The words of Browning set the stage:

"What hand and brain went ever paired?
What heart alike conceived and dared?
What act proved all its thought had been?
What will but felt the fleshly screen?"

It is the fatal obtrusion of "the fleshly screen," undermining the will and bringing to naught the promise of emancipation from the drudgery of a circumscribed life, that is here made vivid and real. For the death of the hero's father precipitates him into a menial job in a drapery shop, where "wage slavery" is a grim reality. By constant study he determines to escape, and news of his final success in winning a scholarship for University College comes to lift him to the skies,—only as a prelude to his being dashed to earth again when he learns that he is to become a father. There is only one honorable way for him—marriage, and the sacrifice of his dreams. The long, slow attrition of the following years, with their soul-destroying monotony of a dreary and meaningless routine, is quietly but relentlessly drawn.

There is artistry of a very high order in these pages. The portraiture is done with delicate but sure strokes. The atmosphere of home and workshop and college classroom, in an industrial city in Midland or Northern England, is admirably captured. And bleak and tragic as the story is, beauty is never very far away and it often emerges through Mr. Dodge's evocative words. If this is a first novel, as seems to be the case, we can watch with eager interest the growth of a power that even now is capable of outstanding achievement.

The First Unitarian Society in Newton.

HERBERT HITCHEN.

A LONGFELLOW SLEUTH¹

As one who watched this handsomely bound and illustrated book grow from a gleam in the author's eye, through a paper read at the Inn itself to a series of essays in the *Christian Leader*, I am content with the end-product and predict for it a place in the ever-growing memorabilia of Henry Wadsworth Longfellow.

¹THE CHARACTERS IN TALES OF A WAYSIDE INN. John van Schaick, Jr. Boston: Universalist Publishing House, 1939. 195 pp. \$1.50.

Dr. van Schaick's style is that of the plain man's speech, a proper frame for the scholarly investigations and shrewd insights which mark the work. The author is warmly interested in what he is doing, and so will others be. For here is a delving into forgotten lore, a recapturing of that leisurely past when the lights of a wayside inn meant more than shelter for the night, meant "a friendly welcome, personal interest in the guest, good cheer, rest and refreshment." Longfellow used this once-typical American setting, as Boccaccio used the villa and Chaucer the English inn, to bring together good fellows around a fire and let them tell their stories; characters who strongly resembled the poet's friends, even to the Spanish Jew, long believed to be a figment of the imagination.

Not so, says the author, who tracked the original wayfarer down, after a long search based on most slender clues, and found him to be Isaac Edrehi (not Israel, as Longfellow once inadvertently wrote), as fabulous a wanderer as ever fiction portrayed. Edrehi's chapter is one of the best, with dates and places and the probable history and background of this most singular friend of the poet's.

The almost equally nebulous Henry Ware Wales, the Student, also comes to life under Dr. van Schaick's patient touch. Modest, retiring, and dead at 37, Wales comes to his own as an enthusiast, with his friend Longfellow, for great books and the wide world of ideas.

In like manner we meet the Musician, Ole Bull in real life, who never saw the Inn, but was a close friend of the poet, and is portrayed fondly and nobly in the *Tales*, as he deserved to be. And Daniel Treadwell, the Theologian "related to theology as a gentleman farmer is related to farming." An inventor and manufacturer, Treadwell spoke out against the worship of non-essentials in religion, as did other men of his type in his time. And Thomas W. Parsons, the Poet, who was in actuality a poet of great ability.

Luigi Monti, the Sicilian of the *Tales* and Longfellow's protégé and concern over many years, is given two engrossing chapters, and his long correspondence with the poet is printed in the latter half of the book, along with other letters. Monti's is an appealing picture of worshipping youth and of a hero who was to keep his pedestal to the end.

An equally painstaking and sympathetic account is given of Lyman Howe, the Landlord of the *Tales*, and fifth and last of his line and name. It was Lyman's misfortune, says the author, to make a go of things in a period of transition in overland travel. But in reply to those who have written Lyman Howe as a failure, "he was the landlord who made the characters in the *Tales* come back year after year. That tells the story."

Likewise, one of the sure effects of this original and warming account of the characters who made the *Tales* possible will be to draw the reader back to the masterpiece itself. Nor will this displease Dr. van Schaick who has this to say on his own of Longfellow. "Naturally the most damning indictment of all is that Longfellow preached. Might not a poet preach and still be a poet? At any rate his hearers did not go to sleep. They did

not come from his services disposed to give up. They did not get from his preaching lower concepts of what is good and what is beautiful. Little children were not poisoned by him. The world was not made blasé and cynical. Happy might any preacher be who, like Longfellow, could deepen the love of the beautiful, build bridges of understanding over oceans, and give people of all classes faith in the scheme of things."

The First Universalist Church in Lynn.

WILLIAM-WALLACE ROSE.

RELIGION WITH POWER

Not the least merit of Doctor Bradley's latest book¹ is its apt selection and use of illustrative material. Perhaps the most striking anecdote is about Father Duffy, the famous war chaplain. A young soldier lay dying on the field of battle; and when Father Duffy knelt beside him, he said, "I don't belong to your church." "But you belong to my God" was the answer of the warm-hearted priest, who went on ministering to him.

The same spirit animates this volume of inspirational addresses from Chicago's famous minister-at-large. Doctor Bradley feels very keenly the adversities of mind, body, and estate which tend to drive many in his great congregations to spiritual panic and moral nihilism. As every true minister of religion should do, he seeks to give them fresh morale for going on and going on victoriously. Such is his idea of "A Religion for Today."

"It must be a religion that has courage. It must have intellectual courage; that means it must be a rational religion. It must have spiritual courage; that means it must be brave and strong enough to go to the depths of your problem. It must have social courage . . . it must face unemployment, poverty, slums, war and all the disasters of modern society . . . it must be a religion that is not afraid to attack poverty and economic wrong; it must not hesitate in the presence of social injustice. It must have moral courage . . . the courage of a morality which will maintain the integrity of a free human spirit" (p. 82).

With all the immense enthusiasm and optimism characteristic of him, Dr. Bradley urges the tonic of such spiritual morale upon his hearers. In poignant instances where physical and spiritual reserves have been used up he argues that by soul force sustained by prayer, "the conscious assimilation between the spirit of man and the Spirit of the Universe," one may become a "triumphant victor over every destructive force." Soul force is negatively gained by "segregating ourselves from the destructive forces of envy and passion and hatred and jealousy." Even disease, bankruptcy, and unemployment may subjectively and perhaps objectively be conquered by such soul energy. That Doctor Bradley has proven his faith on his own pulses, the following confidence will attest: "Every day of my life I open my eyes and affirm that strength and that power and that attitude and

¹LIFE AND YOU. By Preston Bradley. New York: Harpers, 1939, 116 pp. \$1.00.

that spirit within me. I say to the Infinite Source of all Light and all Power, 'I am dependent on You for the strength of this day, and You have never failed me.' "Only four Sundays in twenty-seven years have I been out of my pulpit; on more than one occasion I have walked into my pulpit with my head throbbing, feeling that I could hardly stand, after a week of hard work when I had given body, soul, spirit, and mind to the tasks of the week. There is a constant drainage of one's personality when one has the responsibility of addressing vast congregations and vast audiences of people. More than once I have felt I could not arise in my pulpit, that I could not think, that I could only flounder in incapacity and like a miracle I have changed it in a fraction of time. I have demonstrated this truth time and again as I have preached and lectured to great gatherings of people. If I could only make *you* feel, if I could make *you* see that there is a source of energy from which we can contact infinite power!" (p. 58).

Hence, God, this impersonal source of Power (whose attributes are Truth, Goodness, and Beauty), has reality for Doctor Bradley only as an experience, not as a philosophic definition, although we wonder if the fun he pokes at Professor Whitehead on page 88 and at Dr. Ames on page 89 is not cancelled by his own statements on pages 13, 110, and 111. Doctor Bradley explains to his orthodox critics the reason why he does not often use the name "God," and his reasons are excellent—its historic connotations of anthropomorphic pettiness and unethicity are misleading and unworthy. But we fear that his implied theodicy is more dynamic than discriminating. His God, the Infinite Power of Truth, Goodness, and Beauty, governs the universe by immutable laws to alter whose operations prayer is of no avail (p. 112). Yet "disease, cruelty, lust, murder, ill-health, insanity, drought, fire, suffering . . . these things that God has nothing to do with! These things are man's stupidity in not cooperating with the law of God" (p. 92).

No, Doctor Bradley, you cannot have your cake and eat it too, though you have countless illustrious theologians as precedents for such inconsistency: A God of goodness, of infinite bounty in dispensing moral power to needy humans *plus* immutable laws of nature, *plus* agonizing and annihilating natural evils, *plus* poor human ignorance and impotence (stupidity?!). . . added together just don't make logical sense. Dualism, then? . . . or pluralism? Why not be an agnostic humanist and eschew monistic theodicy altogether, but hold fast to the factual human reality of spiritual morale created and shared in the comradeship of humanity?

After all, Doctor Bradley *can* do it magnificently, as his beautiful apostrophe to the satisfying zests of human life on page 19 abundantly proves. We could wish that he would add, in his next volume, equally eloquent testimony to the zest of the scientist and the reformer in applying soul force in devotion and sacrifice and unfaltering faith to the abatement of man's ignorance, stupidity, and suffering.

The Meadville Theological School.

CHARLES LYTTLE.